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Recording as Heckling
SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON*

A growing body of authority recognizes that citizen recording of
police officers and public space is protected by the First Amendment.
But the judicial and scholarly momentum behind the emerging “right
to record” fails to fully incorporate recording’s cost to another important right that also furthers First Amendment principles: the right
to privacy.
This Article helps fill that gap by comprehensively analyzing the First
Amendment interests of both the right to record and the right to privacy
in public while highlighting the role of technology in altering the First
Amendment landscape. Recording information can be critical to future
speech and, as a form of confrontation to authority, is also a direct
method of expression. Likewise, efforts to maintain privacy while navigating public space may create an incubator for thought and future
speech, and can also serve as direct, expressive resistance to surveillance
regimes.
As this Article explains, once the First Amendment values of both the
right to record and the right to privacy are systematically understood,
existing doctrine—including the concept of the “heckler’s veto”—can
help restore balance between these sometimes-competing forms of
“speech,” permitting citizen recording of police and allowing government regulation of certain recordings that breach the privacy shields of
other citizens.
Just as a heckler’s suppression of another’s free speech justifies government regulation of the heckler’s speech, the government may limit the
ability to record when recording (a form of speech) infringes on and
pierces reasonable efforts to maintain privacy (also a form of expression). The heckling framework underscores the idea that liberated and
vibrant public space is contingent on a balance between the ability to
gather information and maintain privacy in public, while also providing
a doctrinally grounded path for adjudicating those interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Citizen video and audio recording of public officials—police officers, politicians, and other government officers—serves important democratic functions. It
creates a record of government action, rendering that action susceptible to critique and helping ensure government accountability.1 For instance, citizen recording of police officers’ excessive use of force against people of color served as
a catalyst for public debate regarding embedded racism, catapulting these tragic
deaths into the public limelight and engendering scrutiny of police brutality.2 The
role of recordings in spurring large-scale protests and social movements, both in
the United States and abroad, further underscores the power of recording to create
political change.3
Beyond serving a post hoc accountability function, citizen recording also serves
as an in-the-moment form of expressive resistance to government officials—
communicating a message of critique,4 influencing official behavior,5 and reclaiming public space for the people.6 As both a record of government action enabling
future expressive critique and a direct form of expression, citizen recording serves
important First Amendment values. It is an indispensable “weapon of the weak”
and a critical form of participatory democracy.7
For these reasons, courts and scholars have begun to coalesce around recognition
that governmental restrictions on recording often clash with the First Amendment.8
1. See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar et al., Black Lives Upended by Policing: The Raw Videos Sparking
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/us/police-videos-race.html?_r=
0 (last updated Apr. 19, 2018). Of course, public attention has not always resulted in concrete
accountability. See generally Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (2016)
(documenting the special procedural protections afforded to police suspects).
2. See, e.g., Nicole Narea, Protecting the Right to Record Police Brutality, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 7,
2016), https://newrepublic.com/article/137533/protecting-right-record-police-brutality [https://perma.cc/
W444-6KL9]. Although attention focuses on police violence against black men, black women are also
frequently overlooked victims of police violence, and citizen recording has documented instances of that abuse.
See, e.g., KIMBERLÉ WILLIAMS CRENSHAW & ANDREA J. RITCHIE, AFRICAN AM. POLICY FORUM SAY HER
NAME: RESISTING POLICE BRUTALITY AGAINST BLACK WOMEN (2015), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/
53f20d90e4b0b80451158d8c/t/555cced8e4b03d4fad3b7ea3/1432145624102/merged_document_2+%281%29.
pdf [https://perma.cc/YHA3-P2EX].
3. See ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED
PROTEST 6–7 (2017) (highlighting the role of cell-phone cameras in amplifying social movements).
4. See Jocelyn Simonson, Beyond Body Cameras: Defending a Robust Right to Record the Police,
104 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (2016).
5. See Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[J]ust the act of recording,
regardless [of] what is recorded, may improve policing.”).
6. Cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, The Right to the Public Square: Hoodies, Head Veils, & Bathrooms,
MUFTAH (Mar. 23, 2017) (on file with author).
7. See JAMES C. SCOTT, WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE 278–
84 (1985) (documenting the methods by which marginalized peasant farmers lacking formal means of
democratic participation nevertheless engaged in quotidian acts of resistance, preserving some measure
of autonomy).
8. See, e.g., Fields, 862 F.3d at 360 (holding that the First Amendment protects the public’s right to
access information about government officials, including video recording of police activity); Am. Civil
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But this growing consensus in favor of the emerging First Amendment “right to record” fails to fully incorporate recording’s concomitant cost to another weapon of
the weak—one that also furthers important First Amendment principles9: the right
to privacy.10 If the current lopsided trajectory persists, the largely unencumbered
right to record will further weaken privacy-respecting norms and sanction privacyinvading behavior.
Citizen recording, although preferable to state surveillance in the form of
police body-worn cameras,11 has negative implications for the privacy rights of
other citizens—including bystanders who may be unwittingly caught up in videos
monitoring government officials. A recording can expose people to unwanted
publicity and capture them engaging in stigmatized behavior, which may have
devastating downstream consequences.12 Depending on the context, a recording
can out someone’s sexuality or gender identity to unintended audiences, capture
and expose intimate areas of someone’s body, and make widely known that a person was engaged in unpopular kinds of political activity.13 As events on the
National Mall from January 2019 underscore, recordings can also be misinterpreted, obscuring more than they reveal.14
These privacy threats are exacerbated by advances in technology and the proliferation of recording devices,15 including smartphone video cameras, wearable
cameras, telephoto lenses that permit surreptitious recording from long

Liberties Union v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 608 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down an Illinois eavesdropping
statute as applied to recording of police); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that
the arrest of a bystander who recorded police violated the First Amendment).
9. See FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY AND
PROTEST 55–57 (2015) (detailing how efforts to maintain some marginal form of anonymity can operate
as “weapons of the weak,” challenging surveillance systems).
10. Others, most notably Margot Kaminski, have attempted to balance the right to record with the
right to privacy and have gestured toward how privacy may advance First Amendment values. See, e.g.,
Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right to Record, 97 B.U. L. REV. 167, 218 (2017). But these
scholars have stopped short of explaining precisely how privacy’s First Amendment values might alter
the doctrinal landscape. This Article builds on their important work.
11. Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1363, 1400–05 (2018)
(outlining some of the limitations of police body cameras).
12. For that reason, the Witness organization, which provides training on effectively filming law
enforcement, cautions that activists should consider if a particular video will negatively impact any of the
people recorded. See WITNESS, 10 TIPS FOR FILMING: PROTESTS, DEMONSTRATIONS, & POLICE CONDUCT,
https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/librarywebfiles/Training+Materials/Training+PDFs/WITNESS+Tip
+Sheets/English/FilmingProtests_PoliceConduct_v1_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQU6-LR6E] (last visited
Oct. 1, 2019).
13. See generally Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159 (2015) (arguing
that government outing of someone’s status as a sexual minority or of someone’s political beliefs
implicates substantive due process privacy protections).
14. In this case, recording of a conservative high-school student confronting a Native American man
at a rally made headlines for painting an incomplete picture. See Sarah Mervosh & Emily S. Rueb,
Fuller Picture Emerges of Viral Video of Native American Man and Catholic Students, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/us/nathan-phillips-covington.html.
15. See, e.g., Body-Worn Cameras Are Spreading Beyond the Police, ECONOMIST (July 28, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/britain/2018/07/28/body-worn-cameras-are-spreading-beyond-the-police.
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distances,16 and livestreaming technology such as Periscope or Facebook Live
that empowers people to broadcast their recordings in real time across the globe.
Increasingly available facial-recognition software that allows identification of
individuals captured on film further intensifies these privacy dangers.17 And
widespread distribution networks available on the Internet allow any incursion to
go viral.18
This Article contends that the privacy harms caused by citizen recordings
impose corollary costs on First Amendment values. Efforts to maintain privacy
while in public should be understood as advancing expressive, democratic functions themselves. The right to anonymity or privacy while in public is critical to
the freedom of association, enabling people to gather together and politically
organize without having their identities disclosed.19 Privacy in public may also be
critical to the cultivation of ideas and serve as an incubator for future speech.20
Indeed, without privacy, private speech itself may be limited or chilled.21 Like recording, functional efforts to maintain privacy while in public can serve as direct
statements of resistance and critique to surveillance regimes.22 For example,
efforts to wear masks or hoodies at protests or to use Tor (an anonymizing software) to cloak online activity are often read by the state as expressing something
threatening, and are therefore targeted for additional surveillance, highlighting
the expressive quality of efforts to maintain privacy.23 To the extent that citizen
recording further burdens or infringes on individual efforts to maintain privacy, it
erodes the expressive First Amendment purposes served by public privacy. In
this way, citizen recording can threaten not just privacy rights, but also the expressive values upon which the right to record itself is often defended.
How can the law mediate the democratic First Amendment purposes served
by citizen recording with the similar purposes served by efforts to maintain
16. See, e.g., Foster v. Svenson, 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (reviewing a privacy claim
against an artist who used a high-powered camera lens to take photos of individuals through their
apartment windows).
17. See CLARE GARVIE ET AL., GEO. LAW CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP:
UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 1 (2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/
report [https://perma.cc/82R7-DS4M] (documenting that “one in two American adults is in a law
enforcement face recognition database”).
18. See Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital
Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 313, 369 (2009) (discussing the privacy threat posed by viral distribution networks).
19. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right
to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 252–63 (2002) (arguing that anonymity in public helps give practical
meaning and effect to the freedoms of movement, speech, and association).
20. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408–25 (2008) (detailing why
intellectual privacy is critical to freedom of thought).
21. See Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating Real-World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1155
(2015); cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 483 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasizing that disclosure and disclaimer requirements can chill political speech).
22. See generally Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1673
(2017) (explaining that in the social context of ubiquitous surveillance, individual efforts to maintain
privacy while in public take on an outward-facing expressive dimension).
23. See id. at 1697–1708.
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privacy in public? How can both expressive tools of resistance to the government—
citizen recording and efforts to maintain privacy in public—be preserved
without one dismantling the other? Calibrating the balance between these two
important rights is no easy feat. But a necessary first-order task in correcting the
current disequilibrium is to comprehensively understand the competing expressive interests served both by recording and by privacy in public. Then, we can
examine whether doctrine provides insight on how to referee those interests.
As this Article maintains, once privacy’s expressive, democratic purposes are
fully appreciated, the First Amendment, rather than serving only as a limit on
government regulation of citizen recording (as the present legal trajectory suggests), actually enables government protection for the right to privacy and to
resist recording.24 Existing doctrine—including the concept of the “heckler’s
veto”—provides a path forward in terms of harmonizing the competing First
Amendment interests at stake. Specifically, jurisprudence permitting the government to regulate a heckler’s disruptive speech toward another speaker—thereby
preventing a “heckler’s veto”—provides insight into how courts should permit
government regulation of citizen recording when it infringes on the corresponding First Amendment rights of those trying to maintain their privacy.25 Granted,
the First Amendment generally does not prevent private citizens from infringing
on one another’s attempts at expression. However, heckler’s veto doctrine,
supplemented by other First Amendment jurisprudence, suggests that where a
heckler’s speech disrupts the speech of another, government intervention via regulation of the heckler’s speech is constitutionally permissible.26 That is, where
the speech regulation is justified in the name of protecting expression, the regulation is more likely to survive either strict or intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment.27 As recent high-profile protests on college campuses against controversial guest speakers underscore, facilitating First Amendment values sometimes requires limiting another person’s disruptive speech.28 Courts and society
have successfully struck this balance when dealing with traditional conflicts
24. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1991) (observing that in contests between
government disclosures and privacy, although “scholarly analysis of the First Amendment disposes us
toward the proposition that more information is better,” the constitutional interests served by
information dissemination and privacy must be balanced).
25. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 124 (2017)
(describing how students’ conduct while disrupting a political speaker on a college campus was not
protected by the First Amendment).
26. See infra Section III.A (collecting authority regarding the heckler’s veto).
27. E.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–27, 46 (2010) (explaining that strict
scrutiny, requiring that a regulation be narrowly tailored toward a compelling governmental interest,
applies when the regulation targets expression because of its content, and that intermediate scrutiny,
requiring that a regulation burden expression no more than necessary to achieve an important
governmental interest, applies when the regulation is content-neutral).
28. See, e.g., Zach Greenberg, Rejecting the ‘Heckler’s Veto,’ FIRE (June 14, 2017), https://www.
thefire.org/rejecting-the-hecklers-veto/ [https://perma.cc/32HX-G6GZ] (explaining that “there is no
First Amendment right to shout down a speaker” and that cancelling campus speakers because of
protestors inflicts an impermissible First Amendment heckler’s veto on the speaker).
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between two competing forms of oral speech.29 And once we have a comprehensive understanding of the expressive dimensions of both privacy and recording,
we can use that understanding to successfully adjudicate these First Amendment
interests without jeopardizing either the right to privacy or the right to avoid and
resist recording. In this way, the important democratic functions of both citizen
recording and efforts to maintain privacy can be protected.
Put differently, we must understand that speech rights are implicated on both
sides of the ledger: by those recording and by those trying to avoid being
recorded. By understanding that speech, including recording, sometimes has tangible, downstream impacts on other forms of speech,30 we can strike the proper
equipoise between guaranteeing the right to record in most instances and preserving the interests of private citizens seeking to remain anonymous. And as compared to other proposed frameworks for resolving the tension between the right to
record and the right to privacy,31 the heckling analogy creates a fair fight between
two sets of expressive interests. In contrast, current attempts to weigh privacy
against recording tend to result in privacy losing because of the privileged doctrinal position of the expressive interests of recording.32 The heckling framework
also best captures how courts resolve live conflicts between competing speakers,
which occurs when one person is recording and another is trying to maintain privacy in real time and real space.
More broadly, in a jurisprudential moment at which the Court is finding speech
where it previously failed to exist33 and transforming the First Amendment into a
deregulatory tool,34 this Article provides a model for how the Supreme Court’s
capacious understanding of what counts as “expressive” could be used to

29. C.f. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 261–62 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding that
it is impermissible for the government to silence speakers because of the reaction of the crowd).
30. See generally J. L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J. O. Urmson & Maria Sbisà eds.,
2d ed. 1975) (explaining that certain utterances are speech acts that have a perlocutionary or
downstream impact on the listener).
31. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Right to Map (and Avoid Being Mapped): Reconceiving First
Amendment Protection for Information-Gathering in the Age of Google Earth, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH.
L. REV. 115, 197–98 & n.266 (2012) (arguing that the First Amendment right to record could be
overcome by “substantial” government interests in privacy); Kaminski, supra note 10, at 175 & n.37
(advocating that recording’s situated, physical privacy harms should be balanced against recording’s
expressive interests under an intermediate scrutiny time, place, and manner test); Seth F. Kreimer,
Pervasive Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 335, 395–96 (2011) (suggesting that balancing privacy against recording might be
appropriate under Supreme Court jurisprudence).
32. See infra Section I.C.
33. See, e.g., Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368, 2378 (2018)
(striking down a California law requiring crisis pregnancy centers to inform clients of low-cost health
services, including abortions, as infringing on First Amendment speech rights).
34. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501–02
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (lamenting the First Amendment’s transformation “into a sword” used
aggressively “against workaday economic and regulatory policy” and concluding that “[t]he First
Amendment was meant for better things” than deregulation).
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rehabilitate certain welfare-promoting regulations—in this instance, protections
for privacy.35
This Article develops these arguments in three parts. Parts I and II offer
detailed sociolegal and sociotechnical accounts of the important expressive, democratic functions served, respectively, by a right to record and a right to privacy.
This paves the way for Part III, which analyzes how these competing First
Amendment priorities interact with existing doctrine. Throughout, this Article
unearths the role of technology in altering, and in some cases amplifying, the expressive interests implicated by both recording and efforts to maintain privacy.36
Specifically, Part I further develops the expressive First Amendment interests
served by citizen recording and outlines the growing body of law protecting the
ability to record. In the process, Part I highlights how litigation protecting the
right to record could give the mistaken impression that the privacy rights of citizens ought to uniformly take a backseat to the right of others to record, threatening privacy rights. Part II details the competing First Amendment principles
embedded in the right to privacy in public and the importance of that right for democracy and control of public space. Finally, Part III explains that once the expressive, democratic dimensions of both privacy and recording are better
understood, First Amendment jurisprudence will chart a true course for reconciling those competing rights, principally through the heckler’s veto framework. In
sum, this Article intervenes at a moment in which First Amendment protections
for the right to record risk overwhelming competing rights to privacy. A comprehensive understanding of First Amendment interests dictates a more measured
approach to the right to record.
I. RECORDING’S FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
Supplementing long-standing precedent recognizing that the First Amendment
limits the government’s ability to regulate or punish information dissemination,37
courts and scholars have increasingly concluded that citizen recording of public officials in public space—information collection—is covered by the First Amendment
and is subject to its robust protections.38 Recent jurisprudence has embraced the
35. In this way, contrary to the views of some scholars, the First Amendment can be made
progressive in a limited fashion. See Louis Michael Seidman, Can Free Speech Be Progressive?, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 2219, 2239 (2018) (expressing pessimism that the First Amendment can be reclaimed
for progressive purposes because of its link to property rights).
36. Cf. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 364 (2010) (“Rapid changes in technology—and the
creative dynamic inherent in the concept of free expression—counsel against upholding a law that
restricts political speech in certain media or by certain speakers.”).
37. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (holding that states cannot punish
publication of speech regarding matters of public concern, notwithstanding that the information was
illegally intercepted or obtained by a third party in the first instance); Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S.
524, 541 (1989) (holding that states cannot punish truthful publication of information obtained from
government agency); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (holding that states cannot
punish publication of truthful information already in court records).
38. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 61 (2014) (arguing that the
creation of video recordings should receive First Amendment protection); Clay Calvert, The Right to
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right to record as protected by the First Amendment39 while largely neglecting, or
pushing aside, the right to privacy and privacy’s First Amendment values. This
Part comprehensively explores, expands on, and catalogues recording’s First
Amendment benefits, with attention to the impact of technological change.
Recording advances First Amendment values along at least two dimensions.40
Instrumentally, recording: (1) creates a record of an activity and is a form of information gathering, which (2) enables future dissemination and critique of the
recorded activity and (3) facilitates a diversity of views. Inherently, recording the
police and other government officials (4) serves as an in-the-moment statement
of resistance and critique of the government officials’ actions, helping to hold
them immediately accountable. It also (5) helps to reclaim public space for the
people, pushing back against efforts to police publicly owned land.
A. RECORDING’S INSTRUMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT BENEFITS

1. Recording as Information Gathering
The First Amendment protects not just the right to espouse beliefs, but also the
predicate right to gather and receive information upon which to base those
beliefs.41 The ability of individuals to obtain information, to listen, and to learn
plays a foundational role in the American system of citizen self-governance, of
which the First Amendment is the cornerstone.42 In our “method of political selfgovernment, the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but
Record Images of Police in Public Places: Should Intent, Viewpoint, or Journalistic Status Determine
First Amendment Protection?, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 230, 234 (2016) (documenting “a growing body
of cases . . . that recognizes a qualified First Amendment right to record images of police doing their jobs
in public venues”); Kaminski, supra note 10, at 177 (agreeing that “[r]ecording should be protected
under the First Amendment,” and noting that there is “a growing chorus of voices that advocates for a
right to record”); Kreimer, supra note 31, at 339 (arguing that “personal image capture is part of a
medium of expression entitled to First Amendment cognizance”); Ashley Billam, Note, The Public’s
Evolution from News Reader to News Gatherer: An Analysis of the First Amendment Right to
Videorecord Police, 66 KAN. L. REV. 149, 150 (2017) (“Most of the courts presented with the question
have found that the First Amendment protects the public’s right to videorecord police.” (citations
omitted)); David Murphy, Note,“V.I.P.” Videographer Intimidation Protection: How the Government
Should Protect Citizens Who Videotape the Police, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 319, 320 (2013) (showing
that the “legal and academic consensus is trending towards enhancing [First Amendment] protection for
videographers”).
39. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 8:53 (Oct. 2019
update) (“There is essential consensus, however, on the underlying proposition that citizens do have a
First Amendment right to record police activity, subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.”).
40. The categories of “instrumental” and “inherent” First Amendment values certainly blur and are
not perfectly precise. But the categories serve as helpful guideposts or organizing tools underscoring
that both recording and privacy instrumentally help facilitate future speech or discourse and are, in
certain instances, inherently or immediately expressive.
41. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 19 (1960) (“The freedom of mind which befits the members of a self-governing society is not a
given and fixed part of human nature. It can be increased and established by learning, by teaching, by the
unhindered flow of accurate information . . . .” (emphasis added)).
42. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (“The constitutional
guarantee of free speech ‘serves significant societal interests’ wholly apart from the speaker’s interest in
self-expression. . . . By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government
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the minds of the hearers. . . . The voters, therefore, must be made as wise as
possible.”43 Access to information helps guarantee that citizens are able to develop wise thoughts, utter wise words, and vote wisely. Indeed, according to
Alexander Meiklejohn’s influential development of the First Amendment’s
role in self-governance, “[t]he primary purpose of the First Amendment is . . .
that all the citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear
upon our common life. That is why no idea, no opinion, no doubt, no belief, no
counterbelief, no relevant information, may be kept from them.”44 The importance of citizens’ abilities to gather information is at its zenith when the information sought pertains to the government itself.45 Relatedly (and perhaps more
specifically), as underscored by Vincent Blasi’s work on the “checking value”
served by the First Amendment, the First Amendment’s protections—including
protections for newsgathering—serve a critical role “in checking the abuse of
power by public officials.”46
Consistent with these theoretical perspectives, the Supreme Court has protected citizen and press attempts to collect and receive information—particularly
about government operations.47 Although the right to gather information is not
unlimited,48 the Court has protected: the right of the public and the press to attend
criminal trials;49 the right of corporations and unions to participate in elections
because it would otherwise limit “the stock of information from which members

attack, the First Amendment protects the public’s interest in receiving information.” (citations
omitted)).
43. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 41, at 26; see also id. at 60 (underscoring the pursuit of truth as a
“uniquely significant” First Amendment interest); Helen Norton, Powerful Speakers and Their
Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441, 441–42 (2019) (explaining that consistent with the First
Amendment, the government can “regulate the speech of comparatively knowledgeable or powerful
speakers when that expression frustrates their listeners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance
interests”).
44. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 41, at 75.
45. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (explaining that the
“expressly guaranteed freedoms [of the First Amendment] share a common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government”).
46. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521,
527.
47. Although I am increasingly reticent to further cement the Supreme Court—and doctrine more
broadly—as the definitive, self-referential, positive source of norms, many judicial opinions in the First
Amendment context are reflective of and give voice to broader democratic ideals—even if imperfectly—
and I rely on them throughout. Cf. PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND
THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 4–8, 163–66 (1996) (critiquing legal academic obsession with positive law,
as embodied in Supreme Court jurisprudence, without engaging in and critiquing the law as a talisman of
our own creation).
48. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding that the press have no special
right to record within a county jail); McKay v. Federspiel, No. 14-cv-10252, 2014 WL7013574, at *18
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 11, 2014) (upholding a prohibition on the use of recording devices in a courtroom
against a First Amendment challenge).
49. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580; see also Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court
Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2173, 2197–2200 (2014) (explaining the
government accountability role of audiences in non-trial criminal court settings).
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of the public may draw;”50 and the right of individuals to receive pornography.51
Lower courts have applied the First Amendment right to gather information
about governmental affairs to citizen efforts to record police activity.52 According
to some accounts, information gathering and its role in furthering self-government
has been the principal First Amendment value identified by courts for the right to
record.53 For example, in Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit Court of Appeals protected the right to record the police under the First Amendment as a logical extension of protections for newsgathering.54
2. Recording as Creating Future Speech
Closely related to the notion that the First Amendment protects information
gathering is the premise that it also protects the creation of future speech.55 If
only dissemination of speech were protected and the productive process of speech
creation unprotected, governments could “simply proceed upstream and dam
the source” of speech.56 The Court has concluded that “[w]hether government
regulation applies to creating, distributing, or consuming speech makes no difference.”57 Based on this reasoning, the Court has struck down laws that criminalize
the creation of videos depicting cruelty to animals58 and so-called “Son of Sam”

50. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978).
51. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“It is now well established that the Constitution
protects the right to receive information and ideas. . . . This right to receive information and ideas,
regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free society.” (citations omitted)); see also Scott
Skinner-Thompson, The First Queer Right, 116 MICH. L. REV. 881, 886 (2018) (discussing cases
protecting the right to receive gay-themed erotic publications).
52. Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017) (concluding that “recording police
activity falls squarely within the First Amendment right of access to information”); Turner v. Lieutenant
Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688–89 (5th Cir. 2017) (protecting the right to record police as part of the right to
gather information on governmental affairs); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 597
(7th Cir. 2012) (noting that recording is entitled to First Amendment coverage as a form of news and
information gathering); Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011) (protecting recording because
of its information-gathering role); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)
(recognizing the that “[t]he First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what public
officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest”); Gerskovich
v. Iocco, 15 Civ. 7280 (RMB), 2017 WL 3236445, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (suggesting that the
right to record the police was a protected form of access under First Amendment); State v. Russo, 407
P.3d 137, 148–49 (Haw. 2017) (agreeing that right to record police is key to accessing information); see
also generally Blitz, supra note 31 (arguing that digitally mapping outdoor space is consistent with the
First Amendment right to gather information and citizens’ right to receive information).
53. Simonson, supra note 4, at 1569 (“Courts that recognize a right to record have relied almost
exclusively on one First Amendment value: promoting self-government through the free discussion of
governmental affairs.”).
54. 655 F.3d at 82–84 (holding that the arrest of an individual filming police as they forcibly arrested
another individual in the Boston Common—“the oldest city park in the United States and the apotheosis
of a public forum”—violated the First Amendment right to record).
55. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 3 (1958) (“[S]peech is what makes [a person] a
political being.”) (gendered language revised).
56. Buehrle v. City of Key West, 813 F.3d 973, 977 (11th Cir. 2015).
57. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 n.1 (2011).
58. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010).
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laws that prohibit individuals convicted of crimes from selling their stories for
profit, disincentivizing the creation of work.59
Extending this rationale, lower courts have protected the right to record
as a form of speech creation. For example, when invalidating the Illinois
anti-eavesdropping statute as applied to recordings of the police, the Seventh
Circuit reasoned that:
The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included
within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording. The right to publish or
broadcast an audio or audiovisual recording would be insecure, or largely ineffective, if the antecedent act of making the recording is wholly unprotected.60

By the same token, the Third Circuit in Fields v. City of Philadelphia concluded that for the protection of dissemination (that is, expression or speech) “to
have meaning the Amendment must also protect the act of creating [the recording].”61 Put differently, “[t]here is no practical difference between allowing
police to prevent people from taking recordings and actually banning the possession or distribution of them.”62 Other courts have reasoned similarly.63
This logic finds even more strength when considering that with the advent of
live streaming, as through social media channels such as Facebook Live or
Periscope, the formerly distinct acts of collecting, creating, and disseminating
collapse into a single, indistinguishable activity.64 Collecting the recording immediately communicates and transmits a message to the viewing world.

59. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991)
(declaring New York’s law preventing criminals from publishing books regarding their crimes
unconstitutional).
60. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–97 (7th Cir. 2012).
61. 862 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2017).
62. Id.
63. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1189, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2018)
(explaining that the Idaho “Ag-Gag” law prohibiting recording of agricultural facility’s operation
regulated the creation of speech that is “inextricably intertwined” with the resulting speech and therefore
covered by the First Amendment (citation omitted)); W. Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189,
1197 (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that the Wyoming law that prohibited crossing private land to access
adjacent land for the purposes of collecting data via photography or recordings interfered with the
creation of speech, a protected First Amendment interest); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678,
689 (5th Cir. 2017) (protecting the right to record because “the First Amendment protects the act of
making film”); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029, 1040
(2015) (arguing that recording should be protected to the extent it is part of the speech production
process); Billam, supra note 38, at 168–70 (suggesting that recording is best understood as an
antecedent to speech).
64. Kathryn Nave, Entertainment, News or Real Life? Live Streaming is Complicated, WIRED (Jan. 5,
2017), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/live-now-periscope-twitch-facebook-live [https://perma.cc/PS3MY53V] (documenting the proliferation of live-streaming apps). But see Kaminski, supra note 10, at 188
(distinguishing recording from speaking because speaking’s expressive moment is created at the same
time as its dissemination).
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3. Recording as Facilitating Diversity of Views
Citizen recording also increases the diversity of views—in the most literal
sense. In addition to facilitating self-governance, one of the other key functions
of the freedom of speech is to safeguard a marketplace of divergent ideas from
which “truth”65 can emerge.66 But for public discourse to so operate,67 there must
indeed be different viewpoints—there must be options from which to select. And
so, the Supreme Court has held that in order to promote a diversity of ideas within
the marketplace: students must be allowed to wear armbands of protest in
schools;68 states cannot prohibit government employees from being members of
the Communist party;69 and cable companies can be required to carry local television stations because of the government’s interest in “promoting the widespread
dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources.”70
The same principles extend to visual depictions. Diversity of perspective matters, as unfortunate recent events on the National Mall underscore.71 Dashboard
cameras and police body-worn cameras privilege the physical perspective and experience of the government. As Seth Stoughton’s innovative research has highlighted, the same conduct can look quite different from different perspectives.72
From the perspective of a body camera, a dance may look like a fight, and a person attempting to evade a bee may appear threatening. Moreover, people’s life

65. In contrast to this standard democratic account of the normative value of the search for truth, the
idea that truth or even consensus can emerge from public debate (or should even be the goal), is hotly
contested by, among others, Chantal Mouffe. She explains that public space is a hegemonic one
involving agonistic contestations among ideological adversaries—and that the contestation, rather than
consensus, is the key value of public deliberation. CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE
WORLD POLITICALLY 91–92 (2013).
66. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
“the theory of our Constitution” is that “the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas,” and “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition
of the market”); see also generally W. Wat Hopkins, The Supreme Court Defines the Marketplace of
Ideas, 73 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 40 (1996) (documenting the widespread use of the
marketplace of ideas metaphor within the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence).
67. Despite its prevalence in First Amendment jurisprudence, the marketplace of ideas metaphor has
come under critique for relying on the questionable notion that truth is objective, rather than subjective
and the product of social forces—among other reasons. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 46, at 549–50.
68. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511–13 (1969).
69. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603, 609–10 (1967).
70. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–64 (1994).
71. Mervosh & Rueb, supra note 14 (observing that varied video footage provided differing context
to standoff between Native American man and white high school student wearing “Make America Great
Again” hat on steps of Lincoln Memorial).
72. Timothy Williams et al., Police Body Cameras: What Do You See?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/04/01/us/police-bodycam-video.html (contrasting police body
camera videos with videos from other physical perspectives); see also G. Daniel Lassiter et al.,
Accountability and the Camera Perspective Bias in Videotaped Confessions, 1 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES &
PUB. POL’Y 53, 54–55 (2001) (in the context of determining whether recorded confessions were coerced,
explaining that the “biasing effect of camera perspective appears to be quite robust and pervasive”).
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experiences, prior attitudes, and cognitive biases can influence how they view the
same supposedly objective video evidence.73
The Supreme Court’s most prominent foray into the evaluation of video evidence further underscores the role of perspective in shaping people’s understanding of supposedly objective and neutral evidence. In Scott v. Harris, the Court
considered whether a dash-cam video of a high-speed chase established, as a matter of law, that the officer acted reasonably when he used deadly force to apprehend the fleeing suspect.74 In an 8–1 decision, Justice Scalia wrote for the
majority concluding that there was only one way to view the facts based on the
video—and that the lower courts erred when they held that a reasonable jury
could conclude that deadly force was unwarranted.75 But at least one justice,
Justice Stevens, in addition to the district court and court of appeals judges,
believed that the facts—including the video—were susceptible to multiple interpretations, warranting resolution by the jury.76 Beyond the divergent perspectives
of these judiciary members, a study of 1350 people conducted by Dan Kahan and
his co-authors confirmed that individuals’ perception of the dash-cam video at
issue in Scott v. Harris varied based on their demographic characteristics including race, geography, and political affiliation or ideology.77
Given the important role of perspective in gathering and evaluating facts, the
use of citizen video recording serves an important diversity function. It provides
additional perspectives to supplement those recorded on rapidly proliferating
police body-worn cameras and other state surveillance tools.78 Although it has
received less emphasis from courts compared to the information gathering and
speech creation rationales, the diversity rationale has also been extended to protect citizen recording by at least one federal appellate court. In Fields, the Third
Circuit emphasized that citizen recording enriches public discourse on issues of
public concern and provides different perspectives than police body-worn cameras and dashboard cameras.79

73. Stoughton, supra note 11, at 1406 (discussing the role of cognitive bias in shaping how different
people view and understand video evidence); Roseanna Sommers, Note, Will Putting Cameras on
Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 1312 (2016) (conducting a study demonstrating that
“video evidence remains susceptible to significant viewer bias and simultaneously causes some fact
finders—namely those who feel a strong affinity with police officers—to become more certain of their
judgments and more resistant to persuasion by others who disagree”).
74. 550 U.S. 372 (2007).
75. Id. at 380–81.
76. Id. at 389–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of
Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 903 (2009) (“Our empirical study found that when we
‘allow the videotape to speak for itself,’ what it says depends on to whom it is speaking.”).
78. See generally THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS & UPTURN, POLICE BODY
WORN CAMERAS: A POLICY SCORECARD (2017), https://www.bwcscorecard.org/static/pdfs/LCCHR%20and%
20Upturn%20-%20BWC%20Scorecard%20v.3.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4EL-H4VL] (documenting and
rating the growing number of metropolitan police departments using police body-worn cameras).
79. 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017).
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B. RECORDING’S INHERENT FIRST AMENDMENT BENEFITS

1. Recording as Expressive Resistance
Watching isn’t always about gathering information for future use or understanding. Sometimes watching expresses and even exerts control.80 Although
the use of state-operated surveillance technologies and architectures as a
means of social control is well-known,81 increasingly recognized is the role of
“sousveillance”—or observation from below—to turn the tables on the government or powerful private surveillers.82 Open and visible sousveillance of government actors can begin to exert influence on their behavior as the behavior is
unfolding, and it also serves as an expression of critique of that behavior.83
That is, separate and apart from any subsequent accountability function that recording may serve,84 the act of openly and defiantly recording the government
can, as Jocelyn Simonson has highlighted, express dissent and opposition to
the government.85 It is an “in-the-moment” statement of resistance.86 And it is
understood by the state as expressing a message of critique.87 For example,
police departments and individual officers sometimes object to or try to prevent

80. Cf. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 200–01 (Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books
1977) (1975) (analyzing the power of surveillance to control human behavior and the capacity of
visibility to assure “the automatic functioning of power”); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 33
(1967) (explaining how lack of privacy can render someone susceptible to control).
81. DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: MONITORING EVERYDAY LIFE 52–54 (2001)
(documenting the productive power of surveillance in urban environments); TORIN MONAHAN,
SURVEILLANCE IN THE TIME OF INSECURITY 8 (2010) (explaining that “[s]urveillance is, by definition,
about power” and defining surveillance systems as “those that afford control of people through
identification, tracking, monitoring or analysis of individuals, data or systems”); see also James B. Rule,
Social Control and Modern Social Structure, in THE SURVEILLANCE STUDIES READER 19, 25–26 (Sean
P. Hier & Joshua Greenberg eds., 2007) (discussing the extreme example of a “total surveillance
society” in which all citizens are continuously surveilled).
82. Steve Mann & Joseph Ferenbok, New Media and the Power Politics of Sousveillance in a
Surveillance-Dominated World, 11 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 18, 25 (2013) (“[T]here is power in the act
of looking back . . . .”).
83. Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment and Networked Public
Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 66 (2007) (explaining that forms of sousveillance, such as deploying cameras
at protests, “can be an empowering activity” because it “signals to authorities that citizens are aware of
but not intimidated by the presence of surveillance devices”).
84. See supra Section I.A.
85. See Simonson, supra note 4, at 1573; Laurent Sacharoff, Cell Phone Buffer Zones, 10 U. ST.
THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 94, 97 (2016) (agreeing that recording police can serve as a form of direct,
protest expression holding police accountable).
86. Simonson, supra note 4, at 1568 (explaining that civilians who record the police “communicate to
police officers in the moment that someone is watching them” and that “[t]he transfer of power inherent in
the act of observation turns the filming of a police officer in public into a form of resistance—into a
challenge to their authority”); see also Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 391, 415
(2016) (characterizing organized citizen copwatching as “a form of resistance”).
87. See Mann & Ferenbok, supra note 82, at 20 (“[W]hen citizens point their cameras at the
architects of the ‘surveillance superhighway’, or when photographers simply take pictures of bridges or
buildings, they often come under attack, especially as police have placed photographers under
suspicion.”).
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recording because it communicates resistance to their activities.88
To the extent that the act of recording expresses a message of resistance at the
moment the recording occurs, it is a direct form of speech entitled to First
Amendment coverage under the long line of Supreme Court authority recognizing that embodied conduct is often expressive.89 And that expression directly furthers individual autonomy, another important First Amendment value.90 That is,
in addition to the collective, societal benefits of robust public discourse, protection for freedom of speech also advances individualistic autonomy, permitting
self-exploration and self-determination.91 The act of recording operates as an
assertion of the recorder’s agency toward the object being filmed—often the
government—establishing the recorder’s independence through the communicative act of recording qua resisting. Although courts have not yet heavily adopted
the “recording as direct expression” thesis, it is nevertheless a critical reason that
recording is entitled to First Amendment coverage.
2. Recording as Reclaiming the Public Square
First Amendment protections are at their most robust in public forums—public
land such as sidewalks, parks, and town squares that are, at least in theory, open
to all people and all forms of expression.92 But access to such public forums
is increasingly limited.93 For one, the increased privatization of historically
publicly-owned space has decreased the venues available for public expression
and embodied forms of popular sovereignty.94 First Amendment protections do
not usually extend to private property because of the lack of state action.95

88. Cf. Tina Moore & Sarah Trefethen, City has ‘Epidemic’ of Bystanders Recording Cop Arrests:
Bratton, N.Y. POST (May 25, 2016, 9:56 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/05/25/city-has-epidemic-ofbystanders-recording-cop-arrests-bratton/ [https://perma.cc/752W-TWM8] (quoting NYPD Commissioner
Bill Bratton suggesting that, in some instances, recording of arrests interferes with the arrest).
89. Examples of covered expressive conduct include flag burning, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
405–06 (1989), cross burning, R. A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992), and nude dancing,
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981).
90. Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1993) (centering individual autonomy as the critical value that must be
protected by First Amendment jurisprudence).
91. See id. at 1137.
92. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (“In places
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate, the rights of
the State to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”).
93. See Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 201, 202–07 (2007) (documenting the decrease in traditional public forums and arguing for the
extension of the First Amendment to privatized forums).
94. SMOLLA, supra note 39, at § 8:1 (“Particularly in light of the growth of the private ownership of
many public spaces, such as outdoor shopping malls that form part of the ‘new urbanism’ of the
American landscape and assume the role of the traditional public square, continued access to public
forums is essential.”). For a vivid exploration of privatization’s threat to popular sovereignty and
democratic values, see Maryam Jamshidi, Citizen Privatization’s Threat to American Democracy (on
file with author).
95. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976) (holding that there are no First Amendment
rights at a privately-owned shopping mall); see also Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S.
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But through a variety of mechanisms, people are being excluded even from
the spaces that remain state-owned and therefore subject to First Amendment
protections. Overpolicing, particularly within communities of color,96 Muslim
communities,97 immigrant communities,98 queer communities,99 and indigent
communities,100 claims public space for the state and for hegemonic, white,
straight, wealthy, cisgender communities. Policing works with privatization to
deny popular sovereignty and public representation.101 Policing discourages
marginalized identities from entering the public square in the first instance for
fear that they might be taken forcibly from that square to prison, or even worse.
As explained by Judith Butler, the “freedom of assembly is haunted by the possibility of imprisonment.”102 And, of course, imprisoned communities are foreclosed from appearing directly in the public square at all.103
This exclusion has at least two impacts. First and most plainly, it denies people
the right and ability to participate in civil society—a personal liberty. Second, it
prevents the excluded from contributing to and shaping the social fabric and
community norms through their presence.104 That is, the exclusion of various

Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019) (concluding that the First Amendment did not apply to private, nonprofit
corporation that operated a public-access television channel).
96. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556–57 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(documenting racially disproportionate deployment of “stop-and-frisk” against black and Hispanic
people).
97. See, e.g., Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 285–88 (3d Cir. 2015) (outlining NYPD
surveillance of Muslim communities); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION: HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT WENT TO WAR AGAINST ITS OWN CITIZENS 145–51 (2018) (documenting multi-level
government surveillance of Muslims).
98. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, Immigration Agents Arrest Hundreds in Sweep of Sanctuary Cities,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/ice-arrests-sanctuary-cities.html.
99. See, e.g., JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF LGBT PEOPLE IN
THE UNITED STATES 45–58 (2011) (documenting the over-policing of LGBT people throughout
American history); Wesley Ware, “Rounding Up the Homosexuals”: The Impact of Juvenile Court on
Queer and Trans/Gender-Non-Conforming Youth, in CAPTIVE GENDERS: TRANS EMBODIMENT AND THE
PRISON INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX 77, 78 (Eric A. Stanley & Nat Smith eds., 2011) (relaying accounts of
queer youth in the juvenile incarceration system).
100. See, e.g., Donald Saelinger, Note, Nowhere to Go: The Impacts of City Ordinances
Criminalizing Homelessness, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 545, 556 (2006) (describing myriad
forms of legislation, including anti-panhandling laws, designed to push homeless people from the public
square).
101. JUDITH BUTLER, NOTES TOWARD A PERFORMATIVE THEORY OF ASSEMBLY 174 (2015) (“[T]he
seizure of public space from popular sovereignty is precisely the aim of both privatization and police
assaults on freedom of assembly.”).
102. Id. at 173.
103. See id. at 172–73 (noting that, although prisoner advocacy can “traverse the walls of the prison”
and thereby enter the public square “through networks of communication and proxy representation,” the
prison nevertheless “remains the limit case of the public sphere, marking the power of the state to
control who can pass into the public and who must pass out of it”).
104. Roy Coleman, Reclaiming the Streets: Closed Circuit Television, Neoliberalism and the
Mystification of Social Divisions in Liverpool, UK, 2 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 293, 305 (2004)
(explaining that “the black body has been and continues to be hugely symbolic and representative of
disorder for state and corporate servants,” and is therefore targeted for policing because the state views it
as disruptive to the established order).
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identities from public space helps maintain and reinforce the hegemonic stasis.105
Social structures are maintained in part by “the socially structured and culturally
patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of institutions, which may indeed be
manifested in individuals’ inaction.”106 Excluding certain groups from public
space—from public life—ensures that they are unable to shape or challenge the
social structures of their exclusion.107 This, in turn, ensures the maintenance of
homogeneity within society, characterized not just by whiteness and heteronormativity, but by docility.108 It is characterized by compliance with and ambivalence toward the dominant social structures and norms. As Hannah Arendt put it,
“society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing
innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to ‘normalize’ its members, to
make them behave.”109
To the extent recording, as discussed above, helps mitigate aggressive policing
of the public square and helps disrupt some of the exclusionary tactics, it can help
reclaim public space for marginalized communities, allowing them greater performative influence on the social tableau. Because the very existence of public
space is a precondition for the exercise of participatory democracy and embodied
acts of public assembly, citizen recording of the police can help mark that space
for the people. Recording is a direct challenge to the state’s efforts to regulate and
control who appears in public through policing.
In short, recording reclaims public space in two ways. First, by expressively
challenging police regulation, the deviation from business-as-usual acceptance of
policing helps demarcate the space for the public—in particular, those marginalized communities that are the principal targets for exclusion from public space.
And, second, because marginalized identities themselves help reshape social
structures and norms (and are viewed by the state as threats), the space created

105. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 51, at 900 (arguing that, although our identities are the product
of social forces, “[i]n turn, our outward facing identities contribute to the social tableau and shape
others’ identities,” and that, “[i]n the end, our identities say something” both personal and political);
Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy, 25/26 SOC. TEXT 56, 63–65 (1990) (explaining how the idealized civic republican public
sphere operated to exclude women formally and informally through, for example, gendered norms of
speech and comportment).
106. STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW 22 (1974).
107. See ARENDT, supra note 55, at 9 (“[People] are conditioned beings because everything they
come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence. . . . [T]hings that owe their
existence exclusively to [humans] nevertheless constantly condition their human makers. . . . [People]
constantly create their own, self-made conditions, which, their human origin and their variability
notwithstanding, possess the same conditioning power as natural things. . . . This is why [people], no
matter what they do, are always conditioned beings.” (gendered language revised)).
108. See FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 141–49 (explaining how the control and partitioning of space
contributes to the maintenance of “docile bodies” subject to control by the state).
109. ARENDT, supra note 55, at 40; see also id. at 46 (“The monolithic character of every type of
society, its conformism which allows for only one interest and one opinion, is ultimately rooted in the
one-ness of [hu]man-kind . . . .” (gendered language revised)); cf. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 305
(explaining that normative social environments are shaped by the material conditions of the
environments).
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for these communities by recording will help further erode government control of
the space and reconstitute the space for the body politic.
***
On multiple levels, then, recording furthers critical First Amendment interests.
Taken up by citizens informally and in formal networks,110 recording is a kind of
everyday resistance to policing and the power structures represented by the
police. The videos do not always go viral; they don’t always serve as “flashes in
the pan” igniting greater social protest.111 Nevertheless, by gathering information
on the government, facilitating speech, diversifying perspectives, expressing resistance, and reclaiming public space, citizen recording can play a powerful role
in fulfilling the First Amendment’s guarantee of participatory democracy and
popular sovereignty.
C. THE LOPSIDED FIRST AMENDMENT TRAJECTORY

Although courts and scholars have yet to comprehensively capture all of the
expressive interests served by recording (documented above), they are nevertheless correct that the First Amendment covers recording of government officials.
But the developing law regarding the right to record the police coupled with
broader law rejecting tort claims of privacy-invading recording in public is creating a lopsided jurisprudence in favor of a largely unfettered right to record in public space. Courts have recognized some of the First Amendment values to
protecting recording while ignoring or downplaying the First Amendment values
of privacy.
In case after case, courts have recognized a broad right to record government
officials, often without squarely incorporating the ambient privacy harms that
such a right may have on private citizens captured in the video.112 The Seventh
Circuit came the closest to integrating privacy into the doctrinal framework in
2012, but still fell short. In American Civil Liberties Union v. Alvarez, the court
held that an Illinois eavesdropping statute impermissibly burdened the First
Amendment when applied to recordings of law enforcement officers because the
“statute operates at the front end of the speech process by restricting the use of a
common, indeed ubiquitous, instrument of communication . . . suppress[ing]
speech just as effectively as restricting the dissemination of the resulting recording.”113 Although the court found the eavesdropping statute content-neutral and
110. Simonson, supra note 86, at 408–09 (juxtaposing organized copwatching efforts with
spontaneous citizen recording of police).
111. See SCOTT, supra note 7, at 29 (contrasting the often menial struggles of day-to-day peasant
resistance with attempts at revolution or open rebellion, which may attract more attention while
achieving less).
112. See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1203–05 (9th Cir. 2018); W.
Watersheds Project v. Michael, 869 F.3d 1189, 1195–97 (10th Cir. 2017); Turner v. Lieutenant Driver,
848 F.3d 678, 688–90 (5th Cir. 2017); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000);
Gerskovich v. Iocco, 15 Civ. 7280 (RMB), 2017 WL 3236445, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017); State v.
Russo, 407 P.3d 137, 148–49 (Haw. 2017).
113. 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012).
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therefore applied the intermediate scrutiny test, requiring an important public-interest justification and a reasonably close fit between the law’s means and ends,
instead of strict scrutiny, it nevertheless struck down the statute as applied to
recording of the police in public.114 The court recognized that the government’s
theoretical interest in protecting conversational privacy was an important governmental interest—and indeed, that “protection of personal conversational privacy
serves First Amendment interests.”115 But the court neglected to meaningfully
integrate those privacy interests into its analysis because it concluded that the
case “has nothing to do with private conversations or surreptitious interceptions.”116 Perhaps the case’s procedural posture—a preenforcement challenge
devoid of actual facts—facilitated the court’s ability to presume that recording of
police would not endanger bystander privacy interests.117 The end result is that
the expressive privacy interests of those captured by citizen recording (including
citizen recording that includes both police and other citizens or bystanders) were
diminished.
Similarly, as noted, in Fields v. City of Philadelphia, the Third Circuit held
that citizen efforts to digitally record the police were protected pursuant to First
Amendment safeguards over collecting information.118 In Fields, while observing
that the right to record was not absolute and could be subject to time, place, and
manner restrictions, the court was less than clear about what level of scrutiny it
applied to the challenged police suppression of recording because the defendants,
in fact, offered no government interest to justify the suppression of the
recordings.119
As a final example, in Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit also upheld the right to
record police as falling within the First Amendment’s protection of gathering and
disseminating information.120 There, as in Fields, the court recognized that “the
right to film is not without limitations” and “may be subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions.”121 But, based on the facts of the case which
involved police arrest of an individual attempting to film the officers arresting
another person, the court found no occasion to consider which government interests could justify limitations on the right to record.122
In short, although courts have gestured to theoretical limitations on the right to
record in the form of content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions, they
have rarely upheld any restrictions. Put differently, though the outcomes of these
particular cases may have been correct because ambient or bystander privacy
harms were not vociferously raised, the gestalt of this jurisprudence risks the
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 603–05.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 606.
See id. at 586.
862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 360.
655 F.3d 78, 79 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id. at 84.
Id. at 79, 84.
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impression that the right to record activity in public space and government actors
is not susceptible to meaningful constitutional limitation.
The arc of the right to record police jurisprudence is perhaps not surprising
given that even when the recording of public space has been targeted at private
citizens (as opposed to government officials), courts have historically rejected
tort suits seeking to regulate such recording. In such tort suits, courts have often
embraced a requirement of complete secrecy—concluding that once information
is exposed to the public at all, it is fair game.123 Based on the requirement of complete secrecy, courts have rejected: efforts to regulate a magazine that published
photos of a woman briefly exposing her torso among a group of friends because it
occurred in a public place;124 tabloids that publish photos of people taken through
the windows of their homes;125 and people who take photos up the skirts of
women in public.126 As Elizabeth Paton-Simpson has summarized, “Plaintiffs
have been denied any right to privacy not only on the street but also in shops,
laundromats, restaurants, health spas, parking lots, airports, common areas of
cruise ships, and school buildings.”127 And tort law rejects these suits attempting
to regulate recording of public space in part because such regulation would purportedly violate the First Amendment.128 On multiple occasions, the Supreme
Court has confirmed that tort law is a form of state action or regulation because
judges make the rule of law and enforce the decision.129 Pursuant to this reasoning, privacy tort suits run afoul of the First Amendment when they punish speech
that further disseminates information already in the public sphere.130

123. Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for
Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 1070–71 (1995); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Privacy’s
Double Standards, 93 WASH. L. REV. 2051, 2056 (2018).
124. Barnhart v. Paisano Publ’ns, LLC, 457 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (D. Md. 2006).
125. Solomon v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., Civ. A. No. DKC 95-3327, 1996 WL 635384, at *3 (D. Md.
June 21, 1996).
126. Gary v. State, 790 S.E.2d 150, 151, 154 (Ga. Ct. App. 2016); see Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual
Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 1870, 1914–15 (2019) (explaining that “up-skirt photos” have traditionally not
been protected by privacy torts).
127. Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, Privacy and the Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in
Public Places, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 305, 310–11 (2000) (citations omitted).
128. McClurg, supra note 123, at 1070–71 (explaining that the First Amendment has been applied to
limit the public disclosure tort and attempts to regulate the dissemination of information); cf. Eugene
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop
People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1123 (2000) (arguing that tort restrictions on
the disclosure of someone’s personal information could violate the First Amendment).
129. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.”).
130. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (holding that the First Amendment
protects the publication of information contained in court records); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491
U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (holding that imposing civil liability on a newspaper for publication of rape
victim’s name that had previously been contained in public police report was inconsistent with the First
Amendment); cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–35 (2001) (holding that imposing civil liability
on a media outlet that lawfully obtained information of public concern was inconsistent with the First
Amendment).
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There are important exceptions to this general trajectory toward an unbounded
right to record. There are instances of courts recognizing that privacy is not allor-nothing and that it exists along gradations—even in public.131 But they are the
exception. The following Part’s effort to amplify the First Amendment interests
served by privacy in public builds on those cases and, as discussed in Part III, provides a stronger normative and doctrinal framework for privacy in public—one
grounded in the First Amendment itself.
II. PRIVACY’S FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
Despite its First Amendment pedigree, recording also has costs—costs to
privacy and its equally critical role in furthering democratic, First Amendment
values.132 Privacy, like recording, furthers First Amendment interests on both
instrumental and inherent levels.133 Instrumentally, privacy can: (1) serve as an
incubator for future speech, (2) enable simultaneous speech that would not
occur without anonymity, and (3) facilitate the freedom of association.
Inherently, efforts to maintain privacy can: (4) operate as a direct statement of
expression, (5) help reclaim public space for the people, and (6) prevent
homogenization.
Although scholars, including myself, have trumpeted some of the First
Amendment interests served by privacy,134 thus far relatively little attention has
been paid to how privacy’s First Amendment interests might be used to justify
modest regulation of citizen recording in public. That is, although a connection
has been drawn between privacy’s ability to promote certain First Amendment
values on a general level, there has been less effort to explain how those values
interact with doctrine to justify limitations on recording.135 Instead, in efforts
to satisfy the First Amendment requirements that restrictions on speech satisfy
strict scrutiny if the restriction is content-based or intermediate scrutiny if
content-neutral,136 litigation and scholarship have attempted to justify limitations
on recording largely by emphasizing privacy regulations’ content-neutrality and
131. See, e.g., Safari Club Int’l v. Rudolph, 862 F.3d 1113, 1116, 1126 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining
that the mere fact that the defendant recorded a conversation with plaintiff in a public restaurant did not
automatically defeat claims that the recording and subsequent posting on YouTube were privacy
violations because privacy is “relative”); Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So. 2d 474, 477–78
(Ala. 1964); see also generally Woodrow Hartzog, The Public Information Fallacy, 99 B.U. L. REV. 459
(2019) (critiquing the notion that there is no right to privacy in public).
132. See generally J. Alex Halderman et al., Privacy Management for Portable Recording Devices,
PROC. OF 2004 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC SOC’Y (documenting privacy threats
imposed by ubiquitous portable recording devices such as cell phone cameras).
133. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518 (recognizing privacy’s role in fostering speech).
134. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1572 (2000) (arguing that “information privacy law
is an integral element of the mission of free speech and not its enemy”).
135. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 10, at 218 (detailing that limitations on recording may, in fact,
advance First Amendment values, but not explaining how that alters the doctrinal framework).
136. Clay Calvert, The First Amendment Right to Record Images of Police in Public Places: The
Unreasonable Slipperiness of Reasonableness & Possible Paths Forward, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 131,
172 (2015) (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to restrictions on recording the police).
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the situated, physical harms imposed by recording.137 This Article bridges that
gap while also offering a more comprehensive, sociolegal and sociotechnical
account of the First Amendment interests that privacy furthers. To the extent that
either a compelling or significant government interest must justify restrictions on
recording,138 this Article’s emphasis on the First Amendment values of privacy
most comprehensively satisfies that requirement by capturing the true scope of
the interests that privacy serves.
A. PRIVACY’S INSTRUMENTAL FIRST AMENDMENT BENEFITS

1. Privacy as Incubator for Future Speech
Privacy can serve as a protective barrier, creating shelter for the development
of ideas and playing a crucial role in identity formation.139 In other words, privacy
operates as an incubator for both ideas and identity.140
The notion that privacy advances the development of ideas and future speech
has found its most robust defense in the work of Neil Richards. As Richards
explains, “new ideas often develop best away from the intense scrutiny of public
exposure” and “a meaningful guarantee of privacy — protection from surveillance or interference — is necessary to promote this kind of intellectual freedom.”141 What Richards labels “intellectual privacy” plays a critical role in the
freedom of thought and any speech flowing from that thought.142
Beyond scholarship, the Supreme Court has emphasized the relationship
between the First Amendment and privacy over one’s thoughts or ideas.143 For
example, in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court struck down a law that criminalized
137. Kaminski, supra note 10, at 224 (arguing that “[t]he government interest in governing recording
is . . . an interest in managing the qualities of physical space so as not to allow one person’s behavior to
disrupt the behavior of others”); Kreimer, supra note 31, at 395–403 (suggesting that narrowly tailored
protections for privacy might sometimes be permissible under the First Amendment but doubting that
privacy trumps in context of filming public space); Blitz, supra note 31, at 190–201 foregrounding
individual interests in avoiding identification and avoiding being tracked cf. Brief of Amici Curiae First
Amendment Law Professors in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Supporting Reversal, Fields v. City
of Phila., 862 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2016) (Nos. 16-1650 & 16-1651) (suggesting that the right to record be
limited to public locations, to matters of public concern, or to situations involving an intent to
distribute).
138. See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Cosciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981).
139. Kreimer, supra note 24, at 63 (“The First Amendment imposes a need for ‘breathing space’ . . . .”
(quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988))); see also id. at 67 n.187 (“Private refuges are part of what
has saved America from the tyranny of the majority . . . .”).
140. Id. at 69 (“The citizen who is truly free in forming her identity should have the opportunity to
experiment with roles she does not wish to adopt in public.”).
141. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1946 (2013); see also
Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1905 (2013) (explaining that “freedom
from surveillance . . . is foundational to the practice of informed and reflective citizenship”).
142. Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 408–25 (2008); see also Marc
Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right to Read,
and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV.
799, 802 (2006) (explaining that the right to privately receive information is a way “for individuals to
exercise liberty of conscience and self-development”).
143. Kreimer, supra note 24, at 68 (“The Court has regularly recognized that shelter from public
exposure is often a prerequisite to the contribution of unorthodox views to the marketplaces of ideas.”).
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possession of pornography because, pursuant to the First Amendment, “a State
has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may
read or what films he may watch.”144 According to the Court, “[o]ur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
[people’s] minds.”145 Similarly, in Lamont v. Postmaster General, the Court struck
down an act of Congress requiring those wishing to receive so-called “communist
political propaganda” from Eastern European governments to affirmatively disclose to the government that they wanted to receive it.146 Jurisprudence recognizing that the freedom of speech also contains a freedom not to speak, but rather to
keep one’s thoughts and ideas to oneself, buttresses the notion that the freedom of
expression is advanced by privacy over one’s thoughts.147
Moreover, although privacy helps safeguard space for the free development of
ideas that will be shared publicly in the future, those privately expressed ideas
also can serve as a form of catharsis even if the ideas never see the light of day.148
And it can operate as a safety valve or vent for pernicious ideas that ought not to
be acted on.149 Privacy can be a sort of testing ground and vetting mechanism
before ideas are expressed publicly.
Closely related to the concept of intellectual privacy, people also have a constitutional interest in avoiding unwanted speech in public.150 Based on that interest,
the Court has upheld restrictions on speech outside of health care facilities
(including facilities where abortions are performed),151 picketing outside of

144. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
145. Id. (gendered language revised); see also West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnett, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelling students to salute flag “invades the sphere of intellect and
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official control”).
146. 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965).
147. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985)
(emphasizing that the freedom of thought and expression contain “both the right to speak freely and the
right to refrain from speaking at all” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977))).
148. See SCOTT, supra note 7, at 284 (documenting that peasant workers would vent their anger at
unfair treatment in the privacy of their homes); ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE 7–8 (1959) (discussing how subordinate groups, including service workers, engage in
ridicule and gossip behind the scenes).
149. Cf. Andrew Gilden, Punishing Sexual Fantasy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 419, 475–76 (2016)
(explaining that the Internet can, in some instances, “provide a safety valve for sexual practices that
individuals have no intention of ever acting out offline”).
150. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 939, 943–51 (2009) (explaining that in several public places, including on public transit and at
medical facilities, the government has a constitutionally valid interest in protecting people’s ability to
avoid or be free from private speech); Burt Neuborne, The Status of the Hearer in Mr. Madison’s
Neighborhood, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 897, 910–12 (2017) (arguing that in certain contexts the
involuntary hearer’s interest should trump the rights of the speaker); Kaminski, supra note 10, at 231–32
(highlighting the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence weighing the privacy harms to unwilling listeners in
public spaces in First Amendment cases).
151. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714–18 (2000) (holding that a prohibition on approaching—
within eight feet—a person entering a health care facility for the purpose of leafletting, protesting, or
counseling was justified by the state’s interest in protecting unwilling listeners). But see McCullen v.
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residences,152 and the volume of musical expression in public parks.153 As the
Court has explained, the First Amendment’s protections for freedom of speech do
not always embrace speech “that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it.”154 What the Court has explicitly labeled a “privacy interest in avoiding unwanted communication” extends to the home, of course, but can extend
even into traditional public forums, including New York City’s bustling Central
Park.155
As these cases imply, people do not just seek the protection of privacy in
their home—they erect privacy barriers while in public space as well.156
Efforts to maintain privacy in public can take more apparent forms, such as
wearing a mask, but also include subtle but urbane interventions, such as technology to frustrate facial-recognition software.157 Millions of people exercise
more quotidian and less sophisticated means of maintaining privacy every
day.158 Examples include averting one’s face, speaking in hushed tones, or
wearing headphones and keeping your head lowered on a subway. These privacy barriers can be important to people’s efforts to seek refuge and find thinking space in public.
Recording of public space can infringe on the privacy refuges that people build
while in public, burdening the intellectual privacy that helps incubate future
speech.159 Recording can capture the controversial book you are reading and
identify you as the reader. It can disrupt you as you attempt to quietly develop
your own thoughts while listening to a podcast, and it can deter you from attending an organizing meeting where you might wish to explore burgeoning ideas
with like-minded individuals. And recording can cause these ambient or collateral privacy harms even if the privacy victim is not the principal target of the
surveillance.160

Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2437 (2014) (holding that a thirty-five-foot buffer zone outside of abortion
clinics burdened “substantially more speech than necessary to achieve” any government interest).
152. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
153. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784, 803 (1989); see also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 87–89 (1949) (holding that it was permissible under the First Amendment to forbid use of sound
amplification trucks on public streets).
154. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716.
155. Id.
156. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Personal Curtilage: Fourth Amendment Security in Public, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1283, 1350–51 (2014) (cataloguing certain methods for maintaining privacy in public
including masks, anti-face recognition technology, and anti-drone fashion).
157. Id.; Skinner-Thompson, supra note 22, at 1703–04.
158. Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspicion, 55
ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1005–07 (2013) (explaining that efforts to resist surveillance can range from
technological interventions to merely “speaking in secluded spaces”).
159. Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978) (recognizing in the context of
attorney-client solicitation, that “in-person solicitation may exert pressure” on a potential client).
160. Cf. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, EXPOSED 221 (2015) (explaining that video surveillance can create
discomfort, “depriv[ing] us of a secure space of our own, a place to feel safe, protected”).
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2. Privacy as Enabling Simultaneous Speech
Privacy and anonymity also create the conditions that enable speech while that
speech is occurring. Without anonymity while speaking, certain speakers would
not express their ideas.161 This is in contrast to the privacy-as-incubator concept
discussed above, which focuses on how privacy insulates and protects space for
the cultivation of ideas for future expression. The focus here is on privacy while
engaged in the communicative act of speaking itself.
The importance of anonymous speech to a vibrant, functioning participatory
democracy was clear from the outset of America’s founding. As the Supreme
Court noted when protecting the right to distribute anonymously authored handbills, “[a]nonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played
an important role in the progress of mankind.”162 Indeed, as the Court emphasized, anonymous literature played a critical role in fomenting the resistance that
led to the Revolutionary War against England.163 The Federalist Papers themselves, authored to build support for the ratification of the Constitution, were published under the pseudonym Publius.164 The right to anonymous speech is critical,
in part, because certain speech would not be uttered in the public square at all
without the protection of anonymity.165
The right to anonymous speech is so critical that the Court has struck down
laws that burden (as opposed to outright prohibit) the ability to remain anonymous, even if the speaker is not engaged in an activity during which they could
reasonably expect perfect privacy or complete anonymity. For example, in
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, the
Supreme Court overturned a law requiring door-to-door canvassers to first register with the municipal government.166 That registration resulted in the loss of anonymity.167 That canvassers would reveal their identities and affiliation with a
particular cause if they were known by a resident they solicited did not vitiate the
canvasser’s First Amendment interest in not having their identity disclosed by the
registration requirement.168 Similarly, the Court has invalidated a law requiring
that petition circulators wear name badges while soliciting signatures because it
forced individuals to “reveal their identities” while communicating—the moment
at which anonymity is most crucial.169 In other words, privacy and anonymity are
161. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (striking down Ohio’s
restriction on anonymous, election-related speech because, without anonymity, retaliation and social
ostracism may deter that speech).
162. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
163. Id. at 64–65.
164. See id. at 65; see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 n.6 (noting that in addition to the Federalist
Papers, the Anti-Federalists also tended to publish anonymously, including under the pseudonym
“Cato”).
165. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64 (“There can be no doubt that such an identification requirement
would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of expression.”).
166. 536 U.S. 150, 168–69 (2002).
167. Id. at 166.
168. Id. at 166–67.
169. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 198–99 (1999).
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not all-or-nothing in the context of speech—even partial privacy can advance important speech values.
The right to record poses a meaningful threat to anonymous speech.170 Take
the Village of Stratton facts.171 If citizens are able to freely record, broadcast, and
identify canvassers for political or religious causes, the ability to engage in that
kind of anonymous advocacy will be burdened, implicating important free
expression values.
3. Privacy as Association
Democratic theory and Supreme Court jurisprudence have long recognized
that privacy and anonymity serve as critical first-order rights that help make the
freedoms to associate, organize, and speak meaningful.172 For privacy of association to be effective, it must extend—to some degree—to privacy while navigating
public space.173
Doctrinally, the First Amendment protects not just the freedom to speak, but
also the freedom to assemble and to associate anonymously.174 Although the freedom to associate is not explicitly mentioned in the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court confirmed in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson that the First
Amendment’s freedoms of speech and assembly include the “freedom to engage
in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.”175 The court further held
that compelled disclosure of an organization’s membership list could “constitute
as effective a restraint on freedom of association” as more obviously coercive
forms of repression.176 According to the Court, “[i]nviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of
freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”177
170. Angela K. Evans, Initiatives Canvassers Report Harassment, BOULDER WKLY. (July 28, 2016),
http://www.boulderweekly.com/news/initiatives-canvassers-report-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/5W5QB955] (documenting that anti-fracking canvassers reported that they had been subjected to intimidation
tactics, including being video recorded, photographed, and attacked on social media).
171. See supra notes 166–68 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 456 (1980) (“A
country might restrict certain activities, but it must allow some liberty of political action if it is to remain
a democracy. This liberty requires privacy, for individuals must have the right to keep private their
votes, their political discussions, and their associations if they are to be able to exercise their liberty to
the fullest extent. Privacy is crucial to democracy in providing the opportunity for parties to work out
their political positions, and to compromise with opposing factions, before subjecting their positions to
public scrutiny.”).
173. Paton-Simpson, supra note 127, at 342 (explaining that “there is a close connection between
freedom of association and privacy in one’s public movements”).
174. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (foregrounding the close relationship
between the freedom of assembly and the freedom of speech, describing the two as “cognate” rights);
see also BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17–20 (2015)
(explaining that the subdivided First Amendment rights must be read collectively and that the freedom
to associate is an implied component of the First Amendment).
175. 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
176. Id. at 462.
177. Id. (citing United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 56–58 (1953) (Douglas, J., concurring)); see
also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) (holding that compulsory disclosure of the
NAACP membership lists impairs the members’ First Amendment freedom of association).
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Consistent with this conclusion, the Court has suggested that requiring
members of a political group to wear identifying armbands would be unconstitutional,178 and that disclosure of the identities of those who sign electoral petitions
must survive exacting scrutiny.179 Moreover, in its recent decision in Carpenter
v. United States, the Court concluded that warrantless collection of historical
cell-site location information violated the Fourth Amendment.180 Although not
grounded in the First Amendment, the Court emphasized the constitutional importance of privacy over political and intimate associations.181 Warrantless tracking of a person’s location via their historical cell-site information was
unconstitutional, at least in part, because it could expose their movements to places such as a political headquarters.182 Although this Article is focused on the
threats to association posed by recording in physical spaces, surveillance of data
and networked spaces poses similar threats.183
In this way, just as privacy can, as discussed above, serve a critical role in the
creation of individual identity,184 it can also help develop collective or group
identities.185 And those identities can be critically constituted in resistance to the
prevailing norms.186 Theorist Nancy Fraser describes enclaves for marginalized
groups as “subaltern counterpublics” serving dual functions: “they function as
spaces of withdrawal and regroupment; on the other hand, they also function as
bases and training grounds for agitational activities directed toward wider publics.”187 That is, private associations protect the group at issue, but also better enable the group to operate and influence the public at large.

178. Am. Commc’n Ass’n, C.I.O. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).
179. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 196 (2010).
180. 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018).
181. Id.
182. See id. at 2218; see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.”); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141, 158 (2014)
(arguing that private-regarding acts in public should be protected under the freedom of association from
government surveillance).
183. See generally Deven R. Desai, Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in
the Age of Data Hoarding, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2014) (arguing that data aggravates the threats
to associational freedoms); see also, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and
Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327, 356–65
(2014) (arguing that the freedom of association’s protections extend to the NSA’s telephony metadata
program); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 747–49 (2008) (explaining that surveillance
of networked communications implicates the freedom to associate).
184. See supra Section II.A.1.
185. See Gavison, supra note 172, at 455–56; cf. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED
SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 129–30 (2012).
186. See JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE: HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS 111
(1990); Fraser, supra note 105, at 67 (explaining that in stratified societies members of marginalized
groups often form “subaltern counterpublics” where they “invent and circulate counterdiscourses, which
in turn permit them to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs”).
187. Fraser, supra note 105, at 67–68.
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Just like government disclosure of membership lists or tracking via cell-site
location, citizen recording of public space can burden and infringe on the ability
to organize and associate privately. Recordings of abortion clinics are a good
example. Whereas surreptitious recordings of National Abortion Federation conference meetings and recordings within abortion clinics have received more
attention,188 citizen surveillance, observation, and public shaming of those who
enter and exit an abortion facility burdens those who wish to gather to obtain
services, provide services, or strategize on how to preserve them.189 In addition to
burdening the right to reproductive choice (which is grounded in the right to privacy),190 the burgeoning right to record anything that occurs in public space has
the potential to infringe on people’s ability to associate for the purpose of abortion procedures or abortion advocacy.191 The same would hold true of recordings
outside the NAACP headquarters, an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, or a gay
club.192 Given that associating often requires going into public in the first
instance, the right to record any and all things in public potentially eviscerates the
right to associate privately.
B. PRIVACY’S INHERENT FIRST AMENDMENT BENEFITS

1. Privacy as Expressive Resistance
Although privacy in public plays an important role in facilitating future or simultaneous speech, sometimes efforts to maintain privacy are directly expressive
in and of themselves. As I have articulated at greater length elsewhere,193 in a
social context of widespread surveillance where exposure is the norm rather than
the exception,194 functional efforts to maintain privacy while in public are not

188. See, e.g., Richard Pérez-Pe~
na, Anti-Abortion Activists Charged in Planned Parenthood Video
Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/29/us/planned-parenthood-videocharges.html.
189. See, e.g., Rachel L. Braunstein, Note, A Remedy for Abortion Seekers Under the Invasion of
Privacy Tort, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 309, 309 (2002) (documenting use of film and publicity to harass
abortion patients and providers); Alice Chapman, Note, Privacy Rights and Abortion Outing: A
Proposal for Using Common-Law Torts to Protect Abortion Patients and Staff, 112 YALE L.J. 1545,
1545–46 (2003) (same); Yochi J. Dreazen, In the Shadows: Photos of Women Who Get Abortions Go Up
on Internet — Activist-Photographers Prowl Clinics, Feed Web Masters Like Georgia’s Mr. Horsley —
‘A Bull’s-Eye on Their Backs,’ WALL ST. J., May 28, 2002, at A1; cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct.
2518, 2525–26 (2014) (discussing clashes between abortion opponents and abortion rights advocates
outside of reproductive health clinics).
190. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (protecting women’s ability to choose as part of the
privacy rights guaranteed by substantive due process); see also Scott Skinner-Thompson et al.,
Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 126, 138–42 (2016) (chronicling the
Court’s treatment of abortion rights under the right to privacy).
191. See, e.g., United States v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90–91 (D. Conn. 1998) (concluding that
women had no claim to privacy over videotapes of them entering clinic because individuals have no
claim to privacy when walking down public streets).
192. Cf. Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1047–48 (1984) (finding no privacy
violation for publishing the fact that a person was gay because he had been seen at gay bars).
193. See Skinner-Thompson, supra note 22.
194. HARCOURT, supra note 160, at 15 (explaining that we now live in an “expository society” where
we are expected wittingly and unwittingly to provide our information to the public).
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merely a utilitarian tool for safeguarding information, but are performative, expressive statements of resistance and critique against the surveillance society.
When people wear hoodies or head veils in public to hide their identities, they
may be engaged in active, expressive opposition to the surveillance regime.195
They are signaling a refusal to be surveilled.196 The same holds true in the digital
world when people use obfuscation technologies to cloak their online movements. Individuals often self-identify their privacy-maintenance efforts as expressive forms of resistance,197 but even when they do not, the government often
reads efforts to maintain privacy as a form of expression—and uses that expression to target the individual for additional surveillance.198 For example, police in
England recently detained people who covered their faces while in public to
avoid being scanned by facial-recognition technology, deeming their behavior
“suspicious.”199
The idea that social performances—how we choose to appear in public—can
have an expressive, transformative effect on society has strong roots in both
social theory and First Amendment jurisprudence. As put by sociologist Erving
Goffman, social performances involve the deployment of “expressive equipment,” including clothing, that help give contour to an individual’s identity and
shape the environment—or stage—upon which the individual is performing.200
Just as important as what someone projects to the outside world is what they
choose to conceal—concealment is as central to identity construction as outward
expression.201 Put differently, the observed can, and often do, communicate.202

195. Michael McCahill & Rachel Finn, The Social Impact of Surveillance in Three UK Schools:
‘Angels’, ‘Devils’ and ‘Teen Mums,’ 7 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 273, 283–84 (2010) (documenting
British students’ statements that they wear hoodies up as form of resistance).
196. To the extent that men of color are subject to disproportionate surveillance, policing, and
violence, the hoodie has taken on heightened symbolic meaning, particularly following the tragic killing
of Trayvon Martin. See TA-NEHISI COATES, BETWEEN THE WORLD AND ME 113 (2015); Mimi Thi
Nguyen, The Hoodie as Sign, Screen, Expectation, and Force, 40 SIGNS 791, 791 (2015).
197. MONAHAN, supra note 81, at 132 (explaining that although countersurveillance practitioners
may seek to achieve short-term practical goals, they are foremost engaged in acts of symbolic
resistance).
198. Bruce Schneier, Attacking Tor: How the NSA Targets Users’ Online Anonymity, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 4, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-onlineanonymity [https://perma.cc/6ZLC-8ZPF] (explaining that those who use Tor are targeted for additional
government surveillance).
199. Lizzie Dearden, Police Stop People for Covering Their Faces from Facial Recognition Camera
Then Fine Man £90 After He Protested, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 31, 2019, 10:19 PM), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/facial-recognition-cameras-technology-london-trial-met-police-facecover-man-fined-a8756936.html [https://perma.cc/MG6W-H4K8].
200. GOFFMAN, supra note 148, at 22–24; see also id. at 1, 13 (highlighting that appearance is an
important form of expression, and is often not normatively neutral, but instead asserts moral demands).
201. Id. at 43.
202. Id. at 250–51 (“Instead of allowing an impression of their activity to arise as an incidental byproduct of their activity, they can reorient their frame of reference and devote their efforts to the creation
of desired impressions . . . . The observer’s need to rely on representations of things itself creates the
possibility of misrepresentation.”).
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The fact that an effort to maintain privacy may serve a practical, material
purpose—keeping information secret—does not detract from, but rather enhances,
its expressive values.203 As James Scott has explained, acts of material resistance often double as forms of symbolic, ideological resistance.204 In other words, “the two
forms of resistance are, of course, inextricably joined.”205
Indeed, part of the political power of efforts to maintain privacy in public is
derived from their fidelity and integrity to the values they espouse—acts of performative privacy live the value being preached.206 A great deal can be learned
about the values of any subordinate group by looking at the forms of resistance
they deploy—the form of resistance can be expressive of the values embodied by
the resisters.207 And these deviant actions all have the power to erode, dismantle,
or recraft social structures, in this case helping reinstitute the social value of
privacy.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that acts of resistance are not just a nihilistic statement of “no,” but instead affirmative, ideological expressions. As Erich
Fromm has articulated, disobedience “is an act of the affirmation of reason and
will. It is not primarily an attitude directed against something, but for something:
for [a person’s] capacity to see, to say what [they] see[], and to refuse to say what
[they] do[] not see.”208
In this way, expressive efforts to maintain privacy in public serve important
autonomy interests that underlie the First Amendment,209 and, like recording,
form part of a long line of expressive conduct entitled to First Amendment coverage.210 Citizen recording of public space can trample, pierce, and burden individual efforts to maintain privacy in public, making it more difficult and costly to
maintain effective privacy shields, which are necessary in order for performative

203. See ERICH FROMM, ON DISOBEDIENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 16–17 (1981) (explaining that acts of
disobedience are key to the establishment of freedom and humanity, and that several origin stories,
whether they be Biblical (Adam and Eve) or Greek (Prometheus), center acts of disobedience as critical
to the establishment of humanity as such).
204. See SCOTT, supra note 7, at 304.
205. Id.
206. See FROMM, supra note 203, at 42 (explaining that ideas have greater impact or effect “if the
idea is lived by the one who teaches it; if it is personified by the teacher”); see also JOHN W. BOWERS ET
AL., THE RHETORIC OF AGITATION AND CONTROL 120 (2d ed. 1993) (documenting the rhetorical impact
of nonviolent resistance during the Civil Rights Movement); cf. SAUL D. ALINSKY, RULES FOR
RADICALS: A PRACTICAL PRIMER FOR REALISTIC RADICALS 128 (1971) (explaining that one of the key
tactics for undermining prevailing regimes is to “[m]ake the enemy live up to their own book of rules,”
exposing their hypocrisy).
207. Cf. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 277 (“Routine repression does its work unobtrusively . . . .”).
208. FROMM, supra note 203, at 48 (emphasis omitted) (gendered language revised).
209. Post, supra note 90, at 1122 (foregrounding the First Amendment’s protections for individual
autonomy).
210. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405–
06 (1989); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); cf. SCHLAG, supra note 47, at
117 (highlighting as facile some of the distinctions animating First Amendment jurisprudence, including
the speech-conduct distinction).
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privacy efforts to communicate and express resistance.211
2. Privacy as Reclaiming the Public Square
Although policing is the most visible form of control over the public square,
surveillance laws and technologies amplify that control.212 Just as citizen recording can help push back on policing, privacy can help push back on government
and private-party surveillance, reclaiming space for individuals within the public
square.213
Increasingly, in order for people to enter into and engage with the public square,
they are forced to reveal their identities or intimate information about their identities. For example, in the past few years, Congress has introduced bills targeting
protestors who wear masks,214 states have attempted to forbid people from using
bathrooms consistent with their gender identity,215 and Muslim women have been
targeted with laws requiring them to remove their head veils.216
Different motivations exist for each of these laws and each law imposes unique
threats: suppression of political speech, sex discrimination, racial animus, and religious bias. But these seemingly disparate laws also have a common effect—they
invade privacy in order to impose barriers to the public square, and, therefore, participation in a democratic society. Each law concerns who can access public space and

211. Cf. SCOTT, supra note 7, at 36 (explaining that “everyday forms of resistance” rely, in part, on
the ability to remain anonymous for their success and existence).
212. See LYON, supra note 81, at 52–55; MONAHAN, supra note 81, at 8; Kreimer, supra note 24, at 5
(“The expansion of government knowledge translates into an increase in the effective power of
government.”).
213. Part of this subsection draws from a short, popular-press piece. See Skinner-Thompson, supra
note 6.
214. See, e.g., Unmasking Antifa Act of 2018, H.R. 6054, 115th Cong. (proposing to criminalize
with up to fifteen years imprisonment the wearing of a mask while “intimidat[ing] any person”); see also
Alexandra Hutzler, Masked Protestors Can Face 15 Years in Prison as Republican Congressmen Push
Anti-Antifa Bill, NEWSWEEK (July 11, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/antifa-maskinghouse-bill-introduced-penalty-fifteen-years-prison-1019082 [https://perma.cc/98FY-JDKR].
215. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, North Carolina’s Catch-22, SLATE (May 16, 2016, 8:45 AM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2016/05/16/north_carolina_s_hb2_puts_transgender_people_in_an_
impossible_catch_22.html [https://perma.cc/UG2S-Y5BE] (detailing how North Carolina’s HB2 not
only forbids trans people from using the restroom that comports with their sex assigned at birth, but
may coerce some trans people into unneeded surgery); see also Chase Strangio, Don’t Be Fooled by
North Carolina, There is No Repeal of the Anti-Trans HB2, Only More Discrimination, ACLU (Mar.
30, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights/transgender-rights/dont-be-fooled-northcarolina-there-no-repeal-anti-trans-hb2 [https://perma.cc/9NVA-FHPM] (explaining that the HB2
replacement legislation sought to enshrine “a right to expel [transgender people] from society” by
forbidding state agencies and localities from protecting transgender peoples’ ability to use the
bathroom).
216. Rebecca Tan, From France to Denmark, Bans on Full-Face Muslim Veils Are Spreading Across
Europe, WASH. POST. (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/16/francedenmark-bans-full-face-muslim-veils-are-spreading-across-europe/?utm_term=.6d7ecd41013d. In 2018,
Denmark became the latest European country to ban certain Muslim head and face coverings from being
worn in public. Denmark Passes Law Banning Burqa and Niqab, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2018, 9:44 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/31/denmark-passes-law-banning-burqa-and-niqab [https://
perma.cc/6L8A-TXXE].
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on what terms. The laws threaten to disenfranchise people from forms of embodied
democracy even more fundamental and cherished than the voting booth.217
Many jurisdictions have laws that prohibit wearing a mask in public, including
while engaged in other core First Amendment activity such as a public protest.218
Some of these laws date to efforts to regulate the Ku Klux Klan,219 but others are
more recent and are designed to target protestors associated with the Occupy
Wall Street movement, the Standing Rock protests of the Dakota Access
Pipeline,220 anti-racist movements,221 or anti-fascist movements.222 Moreover, the
older statutes have been enforced against contemporary, progressive activists.223
Other jurisdictions have passed or regularly consider bills forbidding people
from using bathrooms consistent with their gender identity.224 And the Trump
Administration is considering passing regulations that would define sex under
federal law narrowly as an immutable condition determined by external genitalia
at birth—restricting transgender people’s ability to be themselves and to navigate
a host of societal settings beyond bathrooms, including dormitories, homeless
shelters, and prisons.225 By dictating that people use the bathroom (or any other
sex-segregated space) corresponding to their so-called “biological sex,” often
217. Cf. Bernard E. Harcourt, Political Disobedience, in OCCUPY: THREE INQUIRES IN DISOBEDIENCE
45, 46–47 (W.J.T. Mitchell et al. eds., 2013) (explaining that embodied political movements, such as
Occupy Wall Street, that reclaim public space are a form of political disobedience more radical than
civil disobedience in that they challenge and reject accepted forms of democratic governance);
CHANTAL MOUFFE, FOR A LEFT POPULISM 40–41 (2018) (explaining that with the collapse of any
meaningful difference between political parties and the embrace of “common sense” neoliberal norms,
participatory democracy remains critical, as embodied in the political motto of the indignados in Spain:
“We have a vote but we do not have a voice”).
218. Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to
Anonymous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815, 848–50 (2013)
(cataloguing the different varieties of state anti-mask laws).
219. Id. at 848.
220. Noah Feldman, The Constitution Has Masked Protestors Covered, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 2, 2017,
2:47 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-02/the-constitution-has-masked-protesterscovered (arguing that North Dakota’s new anti-mask law targeted at Dakota Access Pipeline protestors
violates the freedom of expression).
221. See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Oklahoma Republican Proposes Bill Banning Hoodies in Public,
SLATE (Jan. 12, 2015, 2:53 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2015/01/hoodie-ban-oklahomarepublican-proposes-bill-to-outlaw-wearing-hoods-in-public.html [https://perma.cc/6RQU-F6X2].
222. See, e.g., Unmasking Antifa Act of 2018, H.R. 6054, 115th Cong.
223. See, e.g., Matthew Haag, Is It Illegal to Wear Masks at a Protest? It Depends on the Place, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/26/us/protests-masks-laws.html (observing that
New York’s 1845 anti-mask law was cited against Occupy Wall Street protestors in 2011 and 2012); Meagan
Flynn, Georgia Police Invoke Law Made for KKK to Arrest Anti-Racism Protestors, WASH. POST (Apr. 23,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/04/23/georgia-police-invoke-antimask-law-made-for-kkk-to-arrest-racism-protesters/?utm_term=.93a5cdf4e298 (documenting the use
of Georgia’s KKK-inspired anti-mask law against anti-racism protestors).
224. See, e.g., S.B. 6, 85 Reg. Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2017) (proposing to require students to use only the
bathrooms and locker rooms corresponding to their so-called “biological sex”); H.B. 663, 2016 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (proposing to require schools to force students to use bathrooms and
locker rooms corresponding to their so-called “anatomical sex”).
225. Erica L. Green et al., ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined Out of Existence Under Trump
Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgendertrump-administration-sex-definition.html.
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defined as the sex listed on one’s birth certificate, such laws discriminate against
transgender people on the basis of their sex and gender identity.226 But they also
potentially out intimate information about trans people every time they are forced
to use public restrooms or sex-segregated spaces that do not correspond to the
individual’s gender identity, subjecting them to ridicule and violence.227 By
invading their privacy, this type of legislation deters transgender people from
entering the public square in the first instance and suggests that to do so they must
accede to the state’s arbitrary and inaccurate determination of who they are.228
These laws deny trans people agency over their own identities and foreclose
access to the very venues where they could contest the state’s determination, burdening their ability to participate in public life and denying their existence.229
There are also laws, particularly prevalent in Europe, that prevent Muslim
women from wearing headscarves in public.230 Even in the United States, there
are instances in which government actors have targeted those wearing Muslim
clothing for discriminatory treatment.231 And certain law enforcement practices
within the United States have focused surveillance on those that do wear a veil.232
Such policies impose obstacles on Muslim women’s ability to be seen and heard
in the public square. Veil restrictions “condition the entrance to the public
sphere” on compulsory rejection of one’s religion.233 Rather than representing a
purported feminist liberation of Muslim women, veil restrictions force women
out of public space and into the home234 while ignoring the veil’s potential as a

226. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1039 (7th Cir. 2017)
(holding that the school district’s policy refusing to permit a transgender student from using bathroom
consistent with their gender identity likely discriminated under both Title IX and the Equal Protection
Clause); Scott Skinner-Thompson & Ilona M. Turner, Title IX’s Protections for Transgender Student
Athletes, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC. 271, 273–74 (2013) (explaining that Title IX protects transgender
people from discrimination).
227. Skinner-Thompson, supra note 13, at 192.
228. Chase Strangio, Trump’s Attack on Transgender Health Care Is an Attack on Trans People’s
Existence, SLATE (May 9, 2018, 12:08 PM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2018/05/trumpsattack-on-transgender-health-care-is-an-attack-on-trans-peoples-existence.html [https://perma.cc/
P4EM-SSJ6] (explaining that laws targeting transgender people are “part of a coordinated effort at
all levels of government to challenge trans existence, criminalize our bodies, and push us into the
shadows”).
229. Id.
230. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC (May 31, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-13038095 [https://perma.cc/S2BJ-2TDL] (documenting current status of headscarf restrictions
in Europe).
231. See, e.g., Melissa Gomez, Muslims Describe Being Confronted at Pool: ‘We’re Portrayed as
Troublemakers,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/us/muslim-childrenpool-wilmington.html (describing alleged discrimination against Muslim youth who wore headscarves and
other modest clothing to city pool).
232. MUSLIM AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES COAL. ET AL., MAPPING MUSLIMS: NYPD SPYING AND ITS
IMPACT ON AMERICAN MUSLIMS 15–17 (2013) (detailing how surveillance of Muslim communities
chills and burdens the choice to wear head coverings).
233. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 82.
234. Cf. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 100–
02 (1987) (foregrounding how privacy of the home—and of the bedroom—has often been a place of a
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liberating, empowering symbol.235
These laws (and many others) are all a form of surveillance that transform the
public square from a place where diverse people can express divergent ideas to a
homogenous zone where only those who look, act, and believe the same thing
can participate. If access to the square is limited or lost in this way, it will be
harder still to change these discriminatory laws at the ballot box or in the courts.
Widespread citizen recording—particularly if aimed at those engaged in
embodied forms of participatory democracy—works in tandem with these surveillance laws to intensify the privacy burdens on entering the public square and
participating in society.236 Historically, public assembly has provided “each participant with a measure of anonymity or disguise, thereby lowering the risk of
being identified personally.”237 And that anonymity helps embolden people to
assemble, allowing them to communicate power to their adversaries through their
numbers and presence.238
Recording’s negative impact on public privacy is being intensified with the
spread of doxing239—the posting of personally identifiable information about a
person—of protestors as a means of galvanizing harassment toward them.240 The
increased availability of facial-recognition software makes identifying the protestor, and subjecting them to doxing and harassment, all the easier.241 Indeed, surveillance firms and startup companies are developing technology that would
allow real-time facial-recognition analysis of live video.242 As civil liberty organizations have highlighted in the context of opposing the incorporation of such
technology with police body-worn cameras, “[r]eal-time face recognition would
chill the constitutional freedoms of speech and association, especially at political

repression for women, and arguing therefore that framing women’s rights in terms of a right to privacy
“looks like an injury got up as a gift”).
235. FADWA EL GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE xvii (1999) (“Veiling also
symbolizes an element of power and autonomy and functions as a vehicle for resistance.”).
236. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 223 (explaining that anti-racist counter-protestors wore masks “to
hide their identities to avoid being targeted by the white-power groups”).
237. SCOTT, supra note 186, at 65–66.
238. Id.
239. Colin J.A. Oldberg, Note, Organizational Doxing: Disaster on the Doorstep, 15 COLO. TECH. L.
J. 181, 183 (2016) (defining doxing as “the process of using the Internet to research and publish (without
authorization) an individual’s [personally identifiable information]”).
240. Maha Ahmed & Madison Pauly, Wearing Masks at Protests Didn’t Start with the Far Left,
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 29, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/09/masksprotests-antifa-black-bloc-explainer/ [https://perma.cc/PT4A-RTAB] (explaining that the threat of
doxing or police harassment motivates some protestors to wear masks).
241. Charles Costa, The Future of Doxing in a World of Facial Recognition, SITEPOINT (Sept. 7,
2016), https://www.sitepoint.com/the-future-of-doxing-in-a-world-of-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.
cc/2NPW-M7PW] (highlighting that the FindFace facial-recognition website has been used to dox
people on Russian social media).
242. Drew Harwell, Facial Recognition May Be Coming to a Police Body Camera Near You, WASH.
POST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/04/26/facial-recognitionmay-be-coming-to-a-police-body-camera-near-you/?utm_term=.c6f7bea6c833 (explaining that a “growing
number of surveillance firms and tech start-ups are racing to integrate face recognition and other AI
capabilities into real-time video”).
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protests.”243 But facial-recognition technology’s power is not, and cannot, be limited to police body-worn cameras; it has become widely available in the private
sphere.244 As described by one commentator, for-purchase facial-recognition tools,
such as Amazon’s Rekognition product, indicate that “[t]he democratization of
mass surveillance is upon us”—anyone can be empowered to be a surveiller.245
Critically, both the surveillance laws discussed above and the act of citizen recording often target embodied political action. Embodied political action—for
example, showing up to a protest, wearing a headscarf when it is frowned upon,
visiting the bathroom consistent with one’s gender identity, or using encryption
technology, such as Signal, to communicate and avoid surveillance—is powerful,
in part, because it is performative. In other words, in addition to verbal critiques
of the hegemonic laws at issue, embodied political acts themselves directly communicate, signal opprobrium of the laws or government practices, and offer
reimagined methods of social organization.246 They are quintessential First
Amendment activities.
To the extent that unchecked citizen recording of those who have been stripped
of their privacy shields by the law magnifies the harm, citizen recording operates
as an additional obstacle to the public square and embodied democratic participation. As outlined in Part III, that threat to First Amendment activity must be considered and weighed when determining whether citizen recording can be
regulated by the government.
3. Privacy as Preventing Homogenization
As the old adage goes, sunlight is the best disinfectant.247 But sunlight—
transparency—can also damage and destroy.248 It can homogenize and force to
conform.249 That conformity has dramatic costs to individual freedom and human
flourishing.250 As Seth Kreimer has explained, “exposure to public view
243. Letter from 18MillionRising.org et al. to Axon AI Ethics Board, The Leadership Conference on
Civil & Human Rights (Apr. 26, 2018), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/policy/letters/2018/Axon%20AI
%20Ethics%20Board%20Letter%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXQ2-8Q9G].
244. Thomas Brewster, We Built a Powerful Amazon Facial Recognition Tool for Under $10,
FORBES (June 6, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2018/06/06/amazon-facialrecognition-cost-just-10-and-was-worryingly-good/#56e6372f51db [https://perma.cc/KYQ5-357S] (explaining
that with the advent of facial-recognition tools such as Amazon’s Rekognition, “[i]nsanely cheap tools with the
power to track individuals en masse are now available for anyone to use”).
245. Id.
246. BUTLER, supra note 101, at 8–11.
247. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (2d prtg.,
Frederick A. Stokes Co. 1914) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”).
248. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) (explaining that surveillance and pervasive monitoring “incline choices towards
the bland and the mainstream”).
249. Kreimer, supra note 24, at 69 (“Unorthodox but protected activities are less likely to be
undertaken when subject to public examination.”).
250. See FROMM, supra note 203, at 52 (emphasizing that although the conforming person may share
a sense of community with others that conform, the person “does not experience [their self] as the active
bearer of [their] own powers and inner richness, but as an impoverished ‘thing’”).
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encourages individuals to engage in actions that society desires.”251 Privacy, on
the other hand, can serve important diversity functions.
As noted above, state-sanctioned surveillance is often targeted at marginalized
communities, pushing them from the public square. But surveillance generally—
including surveillance through citizen recording—has profound conforming
effects. Public socialization processes tend to “fix” identities through social discipline that encourages individuals to cultivate consistent, legible identities.252 For
example, although certain individuals may put up a hoodie as a form of resistance
to surveillance, others will take down their hoodie so as to conform and not stand
out.253 As Mitu Gulati and Devon Carbado have underscored, “as a matter of both
socialization and formal and informal political advice, African Americans are
encouraged to signal cooperation by giving up their privacy.”254 Removing
hoodies is one prime example they emphasize.255 Surveillance exacerbates conforming tendencies and puts people under a microscope.256
Recognizing that exposure of someone’s identity can deter them and their
views from entering the public sphere in the first instance, the Supreme Court
has, on numerous occasions discussed above, protected the right to engage in
anonymous speech.257 Exposure’s threat to diversity is highlighted by the facts of
many of these cases—those targeted for exposure are often marginalized groups:
people of color or those advocating for racial justice,258 religious minorities,259 or
those with unpopular political opinions.260

251. Kreimer, supra note 24, at 69.
252. See GOFFMAN, supra note 148, at 36–37.
253. McCahill & Finn, supra note 195, at 284 (documenting that in study of British students subject
to CCTV surveillance, “one pupil tried not to ‘raise the red flag’ by avoiding walking ‘round wiv my
hood up . . . even if it’s raining because they [security guards] look at you real dodgy,’ while another
said ‘if I’ve got my hood up and I go into a shop, I’ll take it down before”’ (citations omitted)).
254. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE? RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL”
AMERICA 102 (2013).
255. Id. at 18.
256. See generally Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment
Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465 (2015) (explaining how
surveillance of readers and Internet viewers can lead to conforming effects); see also SHOSHANA
ZUBOFF, IN THE AGE OF THE SMART MACHINE: THE FUTURE OF WORK AND POWER 356 (1988)
(“Techniques of universal transparency, even if their goal is to elicit anticipatory conformity, do not
benignly serve the interests of authority.”); cf. Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 153 (2007) (explaining that government surveillance has chilling
effects that implicate the First Amendment).
257. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text.
258. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 61, 65 (1960) (protecting the right to anonymously pamphlet
against businesses that were discriminating against racial minorities); cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 449–50 (1958) (protecting from disclosure the membership lists of the NAACP).
259. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166–67 (2002)
(protecting Jehovah’s Witnesses from the loss of anonymity that would result from an ordinance
requiring registration with city government before engaging in door-to-door advocacy).
260. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65 (emphasizing that the Federalist Papers themselves were published using
pseudonyms); cf. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 189 (2010) (forbidding limited broadcast of the
Proposition 8 marriage equality trial because witnesses’ politically-charged views would be
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In each of these cases, either explicit or implicit in the Court’s decision is the
belief that privacy over someone’s identity can serve important heterogeneity
interests. As the Court explained in Talley, anonymity in speech is of acute importance for “[p]ersecuted groups and sects” that “from time to time throughout
history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all.”261 Put differently in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission, “[t]he decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a
desire to preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.”262
Therefore, to the extent that efforts to maintain privacy in public themselves
represent a deviation from the transparency norm and permit people who otherwise may feel stigmatized to appear in public on their own terms and as they
desire to appear, protecting privacy and anonymity in public helps push back on
the conforming effects of surveillance and citizen recording.
***
Neither efforts to resist surveillance nor citizen recording are panacea solutions
to the multitude of threats to public participation and social marginalization. But
as Parts I & II have described, both operate in distinct but often complementary
ways as forms of harm reduction—mitigating affronts to democracy—and as
forms of symbolic confrontation to prevailing regimes.263 Part III explains how
First Amendment doctrine can keep these different forms of democratic expression from eroding each other.
III. THE HECKLER’S SHIFT
Once the competing First Amendment values of recording and privacy are
fully understood, the ultimate question of how these competing speech claims
ought to be mediated can be more thoroughly and comprehensively answered.
Although in many contexts the First Amendment only protects speakers from
suppression by state actors (so-called “vertical violations”264), heckler’s veto
cases provide the clearest insight into how courts adjudicate and resolve competing private speech claims occurring in real time and provide guidance for how
courts—and society—could more appropriately navigate the expressive interests
of privacy and recording. These cases suggest that when expression by a heckling
speaker (Speaker B) inflicts harm upon another speaker’s (Speaker A) free expression
disseminated); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198–99 (1957) (concluding that there are limits
on the Committee on Un-American Activities’ ability to invade individual privacy).
261. 362 U.S. at 64.
262. 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995).
263. See, e.g., About, DEFEND OUR MOVEMENTS, https://defendourmovements.org/about/ [https://
perma.cc/G8BU-9GJJ] (conceptualizing efforts to resist surveillance as a form of self-defense or harm
reduction).
264. Jeremy Waldron, Heckle: To Disconcert with Questions, Challenges or Gibes, 2017 SUP. CT.
REV. 1, 1; see also Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 39 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2163, 2169 (2018) (explaining the “general rule that the First Amendment protects speech only
against government abridgement”).
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interests (a “horizontal violation”265), government regulation of Speaker B’s heckling
speech may be constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.
In other words, a horizontal violation between private citizens may, in certain
instances, justify a vertical intervention by the government,266 helping the government regulation survive First Amendment scrutiny (either strict scrutiny if the
regulation is a content-based or intermediate scrutiny if it is a neutral time, place,
manner restriction). Conversely, when the harm from Speaker B’s speech is not
itself a speech harm, overcoming the First Amendment coverage provided
to Speaker B’s speech is more difficult, largely preventing state regulation of that
speech.267 That is, when the harm from a speaker is a speech harm to another
speaker, the First Amendment protection traditionally provided to a speaker, in a
sense, partially shifts to and is shared with the speaker whose voice is being
diminished.268
The analogy of “recording” to “heckling” underscores that sometimes expression is itself expression-reducing, helping us more nimbly weigh the sometimes
competing expressive interests served by recording and privacy. It provides the
most concrete context of permissible government regulation of competing private
speech. This Part expands on these themes by first explaining in further detail the
concept of the heckler’s veto and how it would transform privacy from a First
Amendment antagonist to First Amendment coverage (section III.A), and then
applies the heckler’s framework to some real-world examples in which privacy is
threatened by citizen recording or photography (section III.B). Finally, section
III.C concludes with a comparison of the heckling framework to other proposed
conceptualizations of how recording and privacy could be balanced.269

265. Waldron, supra note 264, at 1.
266. Gregory P. Magarian, When Audiences Object: Free Speech and Campus Speaker Protests, 90
U. COLO. L. REV. 551, 572 (2019) (“Shouting down [a speaker] presumptively offends free speech
principles for the obvious reason that it disrupts speech.”).
267. Cf. id. at 572–73 (“When dissenting speech disrupts private expression rather than action or
government speech, the dissent transgresses the boundaries within which we ordinarily value the
contribution civil disobedience makes to the system of free expression. We want civil disobedience to
expand public discourse by expressing and embodying opposition to the status quo, not to contract
public discourse by turning disagreements into shouting matches.”).
268. Cf. Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to
Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 175,
178–79 (2016) (suggesting that “the heckler’s veto represents an example of affirmative state
intervention to secure a fair functioning of the marketplace of ideas”).
269. Expanding the heckler’s veto concept—where the government is lawfully mediating competing
private speakers—also helps break down the widely critiqued, general First Amendment rule that there
is no affirmative right to access a particular speech platform, but only a requirement that the government
remain neutral as to private speakers’ competing free-speech interests. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About
Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 378–79
(foregrounding critiques of First Amendment law’s failure to account for inequitable ability to access
speech platforms); see generally Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of Colliding First Amendment
Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of Participation-Enhancing Review, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185 (2007) (critiquing First Amendment doctrine’s reliance on government
neutrality and advocating an approach that guarantees a level of expressive, participatory access).
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A. FROM FIRST AMENDMENT ANTAGONIST TO FIRST AMENDMENT COVERAGE

As documented in section I.C, in the majority of right-to-record cases and
privacy-tort cases involving intrusions in “public,” the expressive dimension of
recording is given weight, while the expressive dimension of privacy is often discounted or put on the back burner. As a result, once either the First Amendment’s
onerous strict scrutiny test or the still robust intermediate scrutiny time, place,
and manner test is applied to any restriction on recording, the regulation is struck
down as unconstitutional because recording’s expressive interests dominate.
Similarly, tort suits against those recording or documenting private dimensions
marginally exposed to the public are routinely dismissed, in part based on First
Amendment principles protecting access to “public” information.
Appreciating the expressive dimensions of privacy as outlined in Part II militates toward a different First Amendment analysis—derived in part from heckler’s veto law—when the recording at issue implicates the privacy of other
citizens. This framework provides the asserted privacy right a more meaningful
prospect of overcoming either strict or intermediate scrutiny. Again, admittedly,
the facts of many of the right to record cases involving recordings of police have
not squarely implicated the privacy interests of others caught in the camera—
enabling courts to more easily dismiss or ignore potential privacy problems.270
Unfortunately, that is leading to growing momentum suggesting a largely unfettered right to record.271 But, as noted, even outside the police context, privacy tort
law itself (a form of state regulation) has been overwhelmingly structured to
emphasize the First Amendment rights of those invading privacy, while ignoring
the First Amendment rights of those seeking to maintain privacy.272
The heckler’s veto line of cases suggests an altered landscape for analyzing the
right to record when it implicates citizen privacy. There are two related conceptions of the heckler’s veto in American law.273 The first provides that, absent state
intervention regulating a heckler, a heckler’s disruptive speech would silence
another speaker, thereby justifying government regulation of the heckler’s speech
under the First Amendment notwithstanding that it is government silencing of a
person’s speech.274 In other words, the law recognizes that, in certain instances,
facilitating the speech of Speaker A may justify limiting Speaker B’s disruptive

270. Justin Marceau & Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and Democracy in the Video Age, 116 COLUM. L.
REV. 991, 1055 (2016) (“[T]he privacy intrusion narrative is oftentimes a canard.”).
271. Although some proponents of the right to record have openly embraced limits on that right, see,
for example, Kreimer, supra note 31, at 392–93, others seem to take a much more capacious review of
the right, see, for example Marceau & Chen, supra note 270, at 1023–24 (suggesting that the First
Amendment right to record also extends to private property).
272. See supra Section I.C.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B cmt. c, 652D cmt. b (AM.
LAW. INST. 1977).
273. Waldron, supra note 264, at 6–7 (describing the two variations of a heckler’s veto).
274. John J. McGuire, Comment, The Sword of Damocles Is Not Narrow Tailoring: The First
Amendment’s Victory in Reno v. ACLU, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 417 n.16 (1998) (observing that
“[c]ourts are loathe to allow one person (the ‘heckler’) in the audience who objects to the speaker’s
words to silence a speaker”).
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speech.275 This framing of the heckler’s veto is often used to defend shutting
down protests of a public speaker when those protests begin to prevent or disrupt
the public speaker from continuing.276 As Erwin Chemerinsky and Howard
Gilman have explained, “[c]ampuses can and should prevent or punish disruptive
efforts designed to deny others their free speech rights.”277 This conception of the
heckler’s veto also finds parallels in law recognizing that students have a right to
free speech at school until their speech becomes disruptive to other students’ educational attainment (another First Amendment interest).278
The second conception of the heckler’s veto found in American law is that a
heckler’s disruptive, protesting speech or reaction to another’s speech cannot be
used to justify government regulation or silencing directed toward Speaker A—
the non-heckler.279 In other words, the state cannot “silence a speaker to appease
the crowd.”280 Here, the heckler’s veto operates on the other speaker indirectly
through the government. For example, in the recent case Bible Believers v.
Wayne County, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc held that so long as the non-heckler’s speech does not fall into a category of less-protected speech, such as fighting
275. See, e.g., Carlson v. City of Tallahassee, 240 So.2d 866, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
(“Petitioner’s contention that he can speak while another citizen already has the floor can only serve to
diminish the right of both to the unfettered exercise of constitutional freedoms.”); cf. Dempsey v.
People, 117 P.3d 800, 805–06 (Colo. 2005) (explaining that the government has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that individuals’ free speech rights do not encroach on others’ free speech rights); In re Kay,
464 P.2d 142, 149 (Cal. 1970) (“[T]he state retains a legitimate concern in ensuring that some
individuals’ unruly assertion of their rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens’ rights of
free association and discussion. Freedom of everyone to talk at once can destroy the right of anyone
effectively to talk at all. Free expression can expire as tragically in the tumult of license as in the silence
of censorship.” (citation omitted)).
276. See Erwin Chemerinsky, UC Irvine’s Free Speech Debate, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010), http://
articles.latimes.com/2010/feb/18/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky18-2010feb18 (“The law is well established that
the government can act to prevent a heckler’s veto – to prevent the reaction of the audience from silencing
the speaker. There is simply no 1st Amendment right to go into an auditorium and prevent a speaker from
being heard, no matter who the speaker is or how strongly one disagrees with his or her message.”)
277. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 124–25 (2017)
(“Although faculty, students and staff are free to criticize, contest and condemn the views expressed on
campus, they may not obstruct, disrupt, or otherwise interfere with the freedom of others to express views
they reject or even loathe.” (quoting Geoffrey R. Stone et. al, Statement of the Committee on Freedom of
Expression at the University of Chicago, UCHICAGONEWS (July 2012), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/
voices.uchicago.edu/dist/3/337/files/2019/01/Statement-on-principles-of-free-inquiry-by-Prof.-GeoffreyStone-University-of-Chicago-News-1f1jp6l.pdf [https://perma.cc/66C7-AKA3])).
278. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512–13 (1969) (requiring
evidence that student speech would constitute a substantial disruption with schoolwork or discipline in
order to silence that speech consistent with the First Amendment).
279. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302–03, 311 (1940) (explaining that the
reaction of audience cannot be used to justify suppression of speech); Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch.
Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 475 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The First Amendment generally does not permit the so-called
‘heckler’s veto,’ i.e., ‘allowing the public, with the government’s help, to shout down unpopular ideas
that stir anger.’” (citation omitted)); Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (“A
heckler’s veto is an impermissible content-based restriction on speech where the speech is prohibited
due to an anticipated disorderly or violent reaction of the audience.” (citations omitted)).
280. Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., 805 F.3d 228, 234 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc); cf. Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) (“In the realm of private speech or
expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over another.”).
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words or incitement of violence, the government cannot silence the speech based
on the negative reactions of other speakers.281 According to the court, “[w]hen a
peaceful speaker, whose message is constitutionally protected, is confronted by a
hostile crowd, the state may not silence the speaker as an expedient alternative to
containing or snuffing out the lawless behavior of the rioting individuals.”282 The
court held that the police violated the First Amendment when they silenced a
group of evangelical Christians spreading anti-Islamic speech at the Arab
International Festival in Dearborn, Michigan.283 This second conception of the
heckler’s veto is less relevant to the battle between recording and privacy because
the government is not directly infringing on privacy (a form of speech) in order to
facilitate other citizens’ recording. But this strand of law nevertheless confirms
the broader principle that hecklers should not—directly or indirectly—be permitted to silence other speakers.
The heckler’s veto cases are supplemented by other First Amendment contexts
in which courts evaluate competing speech claims, often concluding that regulating expression is justified in the name of preserving other forms of expression. In
other words, courts have been much less reluctant to protect asserted First
Amendment interests from regulation when the regulation itself is justified by
other First Amendment values.
For example, in Silberberg v. Board of Elections of New York, strict scrutiny
was applied to a New York state law that prohibited anyone from showing their
completed ballot to another person, including through a ballot “selfie”—a selfportrait photograph taken by the voter with their completed ballot—posted on
social media.284 The court seemingly acknowledged that ballot selfies were core
political speech at the heart of First Amendment protection.285 Yet, the court
nevertheless upheld the prohibition on this form of political speech because of
competing democratic interests.286 According to the court, the restriction was narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s compelling interest in protecting the freedom
to vote because it prevented a means of verifying that a voter had complied with
any attempt to buy, intimidate, or coerce the voter’s vote.287 In other words,
although the restriction targeted core political speech, it was justified by the competing need to ensure a critical form of freedom of democratic expression—the
free exercise of franchise.
281. 805 F.3d at 243–46; cf. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 320 (1951) (“[T]he ordinary
murmurings and objections of a hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker.”).
282. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 252; cf. Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 534–35 (1963)
(rebuffing the city’s contention that desegregation of city parks would lead to disturbances and turmoil
by explaining that “constitutional rights may not be denied simply because of hostility to their assertion
or exercise”).
283. Bible Believers, 805 F.3d at 238, 261–62.
284. 272 F. Supp. 3d 454, 472–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).
285. See id. at 469 (“The First Amendment’s protection is at its apex with respect to political speech,
and ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”
(citations omitted)).
286. Id. at 469–73.
287. Id. at 472–73.
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The Silberberg court also upheld a New York City policy prohibiting photography in polling sites.288 Here, too, the court recognized that photography was
entitled to First Amendment coverage, but, in applying intermediate scrutiny,
found that the significant government interests of ensuring the integrity of the
election process and protecting voter privacy justified the limitation.289 That is,
when competing democratic values were burdened by the freedom to record, the
court accepted sanctions on recording and photography.
The holding in Silberberg that restrictions on efforts to document voting activity were constitutionally permissible was based, in large part, on the Supreme
Court’s prior recognition that even orally expressive political speech could be restricted in and around a polling site. In Burson v. Freeman, the Supreme Court
upheld a state law that prohibited the distribution of campaign materials or solicitation of votes within one hundred feet of polling locations.290 According to the
Court, the law implicated three central concerns of the First Amendment because
it targeted (1) political speech (2) in a public forum (3) based on the content of
the speech.291 But despite implicating these three talismans of First Amendment
coverage, the Court upheld the speech restriction because of the competing democratic concerns over the freedom to vote without undue influence from candidates or special interests.292
Finally, in addition to suggesting that the government has the ability, consistent
with the First Amendment, to regulate speech in order to protect the speech as
well as fundamental democratic interests of others, there is also a vein within
heckler’s veto law suggesting that the government may have a duty or affirmative
obligation to do so.293 That is, the government may have a duty to maintain the
conditions under which expression can continue.294 For example, in Bible
288. Id. at 480.
289. Id. at 479–80.
290. 504 U.S. 191, 193, 216 (1992).
291. Id. at 196.
292. Id. at 199; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 473 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that corporate campaign speech could be limited because of the competing First
Amendment need to facilitate and preserve breathing room for other speech within the marketplace of
ideas); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661–63 (1994) (observing that although the
FCC’s must-carry rules requiring cable companies to include local television stations implicated the
cable companies’ First Amendment rights, the government’s competing First Amendment concerns in
“promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources” was an
important government interest).
293. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (“[U]ncontrolled official
suppression of the privilege [of free expression] cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain
order in connection with the exercise of the right.”); Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No.
118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he police are supposed to preserve order, which unpopular
speech may endanger. Does it follow that the police may silence the rabble-rousing speaker? Not at all.
The police must permit the speech and control the crowd; there is no heckler’s veto.”); Glasson v. City
of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 906 (6th Cir. 1975) (“A police officer has the duty not to ratify and
effectuate a heckler’s veto nor may he join a moiling mob intent on suppressing ideas.”).
294. Johnson, supra note 268, at 206–07 (concluding that the state arguably has a duty to protect
speakers from each other and facilitate the conditions of speech); cf. PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE’S
TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 5 (2012) (explaining that one of the core
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Believers (discussed above), the Sixth Circuit suggested that when mediating
conflicts between speakers and hecklers, officers cannot “sit idly on the sidelines—
watching as the crowd imposes, through violence, a tyrannical majoritarian rule—
only later to claim that the speaker’s removal was necessary for his or her own
protection.”295 According to the court, when confronted with competing speech
claims, where one speaker risks drowning out or infringing on the other speaker, the
state has a handful of options: “The police may go against the hecklers, cordon off
the speakers, or attempt to disperse the entire crowd if that becomes necessary.”296
As explained by the Sixth Circuit in an earlier case, “Ideally, police officers will
always protect to the extent of their ability the rights of persons to engage in First
Amendment activity.”297
Importantly, concluding that the government does have a duty to protect speakers from hecklers is not at all necessary to justify such government regulation—
what is clear is that the government is empowered, consistent with the First
Amendment, to regulate the hecklers qua recorders if and when the government
chooses to do so to facilitate the competing speech of non-hecklers.298
In sum, this line of cases suggests that when regulation of expressive activity,
including expressive documentation such as photography, is contraposed to other
forms of democratic expression, the regulation is likely to be justified by a compelling or legitimate government interest and thus upheld. As applied to the tension between the right to record and the right to privacy, the authority suggests
that if the expressive dimensions of privacy are emphasized to justify regulation
of recording, the regulation may stand a stronger chance of being upheld.
Put differently, the Supreme Court has recognized that a cable operator’s
power to “silence the voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the
switch” justifies government regulation of the cable company’s speech so as to
require it to carry local television stations, ensuring a broader diversity of voices.299 So too does the flick of the camera phone’s switch silence others, invade
their expressive privacy, and encourage public conformity—justifying government regulation of recording.

ideas of republican theory of government is that the state will work to prevent domination of one citizen
over another).
295. 805 F.3d 228, 253 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
296. Id.
297. Glasson, 518 F.2d at 909.
298. Of course, the Supreme Court is reticent to recognize that the Constitution imposes affirmative
duties on the government or entitles citizens to so-called positive rights. See, e.g., DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195–96 (1989) (explaining that the Due Process
Clause is designed to protect people from the state, not to ensure that the government protects people
from each other).
299. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655–56 (1994); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc.
v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 190 (1997) (reiterating that the government has a compelling interest in ensuring
that a multiplicity of voices can be heard).
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B. THE HECKLER’S FRAMEWORK APPLIED

As observed at the outset, calibrating the appropriate solution for conflicts
between privacy and recording is a delicate task, one that will often depend on
the specific, highly contextual facts of a given case. But having now fully identified the expressive interests of privacy and recording and having documented
doctrine’s approach to resolving expressive conflicts, we can apply the heckler’s
veto framework to some examples where the right to record (or photograph) is in
tension with the right to privacy to determine if government regulation of the recording (including through tort causes of action) is consistent with First
Amendment principles. These examples are taken from actual controversies.
1. Recording of Bystanders & Police
In the context of citizen recordings of police that also have collateral privacy
harms on bystanders, the heckler’s veto line of cases suggests that the government is empowered (potentially through privacy torts) to impose tailored restrictions on those recordings, including limits on dissemination, such as requiring the
recorder to redact or blur the identities of other citizens and bystanders captured
in the recording before disseminating. The law could also encourage recorders to
respect the privacy of bystanders when making the actual recording by taking
steps to avoid recording the bystanders or notifying the bystanders that they are
being filmed. Protecting an individual’s expressive interest in privacy is a compelling government interest, justifying modest, narrowly tailored regulations that
still preserve the right of individuals to record police activity.
Take the facts of Fordyce v. City of Seattle, for example.300 In that case,
Fordyce, who was participating in a protest and filming activity around the protest,
filmed not just police officers but, subsequently, allegedly attempted to film some
bystanders against their wishes.301 Specifically, Fordyce allegedly “refused to stop
videotaping two boys after an adult relative supervising them asked him to stop
and complained to the police.”302 When the police asked Fordyce to stop, he allegedly refused and was arrested for violating Washington’s state law prohibiting the
recording of conversations without first obtaining the consent of all parties.303
Fordyce sued the officers for violating his First Amendment rights.304 Neither
the district court nor the Ninth Circuit ultimately addressed the First Amendment
issue. Instead, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s determination that
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to their decision to
arrest Fordyce for filming the bystanders because it was unclear whether recording conversations on public streets fell within the ambit of the Washington
statute.305

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

55 F.3d 436 (9th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 438.
Id. at 439.
Id.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 439–40.
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But more importantly, the facts of this case illustrate the ambient or collateral
privacy harms that can come with the specific right to record the police, or, more
generally, public space. If we understand the bystanders’ assertion of their right
to be left alone—their right to privacy—as triggering their expressive interests in
solitude and perhaps resistance, and we understand Fordyce’s actions as heckling
those expressive interests, then enforcement of the Washington statute against
Fordyce—even though he was recording activity in public space—is perfectly
consistent with the First Amendment. It furthers the government’s significant interest in protecting the bystanders’ expressive interest in privacy. In the same
vein, a privacy tort suit by the bystanders against Fordyce for intruding on their
seclusion or, if he broadcast the video, public disclosure would also be perfectly
consistent with the First Amendment because the recording is infringing on the
bystanders’ First Amendment privacy interests.
Moreover, once we acknowledge that the First Amendment interests served by
recording and privacy are nuanced, we can also imagine taking advantage of technological advances to inject nuance into the law and individuals’ obligations. As
Seth Kreimer has emphasized, because the “predictable impacts on constitutional
rights are intensely sensitive to empirical conditions,” legal doctrine “must leave
open an opportunity for citizens to focus the attention of courts on the real and
concrete coercion of compelled disclosure.”306 The law must be responsive to the
empirical condition of technological advancement, including by taking advantage
of technology’s flexibility and adaptability to give effect to more bespoke legal
obligations.
For example, in situations in which a citizen recorder may have a First
Amendment interest in recording the police, to the extent that bystanders—
potentially including victims of police abuse—have a First Amendment privacy
interest in not having their identities recorded and broadcast, the law could, consistent with the First Amendment, require the recorder to redact or blur the identity of the bystander. Indeed, Witness, one of the leading civil society groups
providing training on how to effectively film law enforcement and protests for
the purposes of accountability, nevertheless cautions that, where possible, filmers
should preserve crowd anonymity through, for example, only filming the back of
people’s heads or their feet,307 or using YouTube’s custom blur tool.308
At first blush, any such requirement might appear onerous or difficult to
enforce. But the law—particularly common law—routinely imposes context306. Kreimer, supra note 24, at 107–08.
307. See WITNESS, supra note 12 (providing ten suggestions for recording “protests, demonstrations,
& police conduct”).
308. See WITNESS, BEST PRACTICES FOR UPLOADING HUMAN RIGHTS VIDEO, http://www.mediafire.
com/download/a7v3t7k2b3z6la9/BestPractices_UploadingHRVideo_20160407_v2_0.pdf [https://perma.
cc/5NNQ-23A7]; see also POLICING PROJECT, FILMING THE POLICE: TIPS FOR POLICE OFFICERS AND THOSE
WHO FILM THEM (2019), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58a33e881b631bc60d4f8b31/t/5c6c25b
8ee6eb079bf3967be/1550591417017/FilimingþPoliceþ-þDoubleþsidedþcardþ%281%29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/66MV-AMWV] (suggesting that people should not secretly record the police’s interactions with
others).
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specific, highly nuanced obligations or restrictions on individuals vis-à-vis other
individuals. One need not look further than tort law’s general negligence “reasonableness” standard as an example.309 As privacy-invading technology continues
to develop, the law can and should evolve too, helping to reflect and shape changing norms regarding appropriate limits on the use of such privacy-invading
technology.
2. Recording of Private Intimate Activity
Sometimes recording or photographing people in public, or people who are
viewable from public space, will capture and expose intimate activity intended
to remain obscure and private. Understanding the First Amendment interests
served by keeping such activity private can help lead to an appropriate evaluation of the competing expressive interests, whereas current law often protects
the recording at the expense of privacy. For example, in Foster v. Svenson, a
New York appellate court narrowly interpreted the state’s invasion of privacy
statute so as to exclude from coverage artist Arne Svenson’s photographs of
his neighbors in their homes with a telephoto camera.310 Despite that some of
the photos were of young children, the court concluded that the informational
value of Svenson’s expressive photographs rendered them exempt from coverage under the statute’s judicially created newsworthiness and public interest
exceptions.311
But if the First Amendment privacy interests of those being photographed had
been acknowledged, perhaps the court would have reached a different result.
Although the neighbors were photographed through their un-shuttered windows,312 it was clear that many had not forfeited an expectation of privacy and
that many viewed themselves as protected by the curtilage of their home (and, in
fact, some of the photos were of people through their shades).313 They were
ensconced inside their homes and, indeed, the artist surreptitiously hid himself
within his own apartment so that the neighbors could not see him—suggesting
that they did not expect to be photographed and that, but for his efforts to hide
himself, they would have taken additional efforts to protect their privacy.314 In
other words, privacy was critical to Svenson’s own expression. Some of the
images captured by Svenson literally showed children engaged in the kind of creative, expressive play that privacy affords—Svenson captured a young girl dancing, partially undressed in her tiara.315 The child was ostensibly engaged in some
of the identity exploration provided by privacy, literally incubating and
309. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 2010)
(“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of
physical harm.”).
310. 7 N.Y.S.3d 96, 105–06 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
311. Id. at 98–99, 102.
312. See id. at 98.
313. See id. at 98–99.
314. Id. at 98.
315. Id.
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developing her identity in the protection of her home. Svenson also photographed
people engaged in First Amendment-protected intimate associations or activities
in bathrobes or taking naps.316 And his photographs disrupted and infringed on
the First Amendment interests of the neighbors, prompting some of them to seek
legal redress once they learned of Svenson’s actions.
As discussed in section I.C, in part as a result of the First Amendment’s protections for newsworthy information or information regarding public affairs, privacy
tort law (and constitutional informational privacy law) has been shaped so as to
foreclose liability for intrusions into or dissemination of information that is left
open—even marginally—to the public view.317 As a consequence, lawsuits seeking to recover for photographs taken of people in compromising or embarrassing
positions have often met little success under privacy tort law or constitutional privacy law.318 But if we recognized privacy’s corollary First Amendment values,
the draconian privacy torts rule that information—however slightly—exposed to
the public negates any privacy claim might be made more nuanced and contextual, creating space for privacy claims that serve First Amendment interests. The
expressive dimensions of privacy could be used to alter privacy tort law so as to
not render public access the only underlying protected First Amendment interest.
3. Recording that Pierces Political Privacy
Finally, consider examples in which recording is used to burden or infringe on
the political rights of assembly and association. Recording people entering abortion clinics or attending political protests, sometimes accompanied by subsequent
doxing or online harassment of those recorded, are examples of weaponizing recording to burden others’ expressive choices, over which some modicum of privacy is needed. In failing to recognize the expressive, First Amendment value of
the recorded activities, courts have sometimes rejected attempts to regulate or
impose limits on recording people entering abortion clinics, whether they be
patients or physicians.319 Often these decisions rest on the belief that there cannot
be restrictions on information exposed to the public, a premise which, as discussed, is based on the First Amendment value of public information.320 But if we
admitted that people’s desire to maintain privacy over certain, sometimes unpopular political and personal activities served expressive interests, then the First
Amendment analysis would not be one-sided, and modest regulations of recordings outside abortion clinics or other centers of controversial association could be
316. The Neighbors, ARNE SVENSON, http://arnesvenson.com/theneighbors.html [https://perma.cc/
K96Q-AGC3] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
317. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B cmt. c, 652D cmt. b (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
318. Cf. Chaney v. Fayette Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1318 (N.D. Ga. 2013)
(holding that there was no cognizable constitutional privacy claim where a teacher used a picture of a
student in a bikini that he found on her Facebook page in a classroom PowerPoint presentation because
the information was already public); see also generally Skinner-Thompson, supra note 123
(documenting the rigid application of the complete secrecy requirement in public disclosure tort cases).
319. Cf. United States v. Vasquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90–91 (D. Conn. 1998); Valenzuela v. Aquino,
853 S.W.2d 512, 513–14 (Tex. 1993).
320. See Vasquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 90; Valenzuela, 853 S.W.2d at 513.
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legitimately defended consistent with the First Amendment because they serve a
compelling government interest.
C. WEAKENING CLAIM THAT RECORDING INTERFERES WITH POLICE

Before closing, it is worth emphasizing that an additional benefit to foregrounding recording’s First Amendment privacy harms as opposed to its situated,
physical privacy harms, is that it avoids the risk of bolstering police departments’
arguments that recording is tantamount to tangible, physical interference with an
officer’s duties. Though not terribly successful to date, police departments often
claim that citizen recording of the police interferes with their duties.321 And some
courts have explicitly held that if the recording interferes with an officer’s performance of her duties, the recording may be limited.322 If, in an effort to protect
citizen privacy, litigants and lawmakers emphasize the situated, physical harms
of recording to citizens, the same kinds of harms would presumably be applicable
to police, playing into police efforts to legally resist recording.
Margot Kaminski’s detailed work attempting to delineate the limits of a right
to record have emphasized that recording inflicts a physical, situated privacy
harm on those subject to the recording.323 According to Kaminski, “[r]ecording
disrupts the nature of a physical space,”324 often causes individuals to change
their behavior,325 and, therefore may be subject to regulation because “[c]ourts
have been willing to recognize legitimate government interests in regulating . . .
speech . . . [that] extensively disrupts the ability of other people to enjoy a rivalrous physical space.”326 The existence of this situated, physical harm, Kaminski
argues, will, in certain instances, serve a sufficient “valid and substantial government interest” to justify regulations of recording.327 Kaminski’s analysis regarding the physical privacy costs of recording is compelling. But to the extent that
recording is directed at the police (the principal context in which advocates are
interested in preserving the right to record), the emphasis on recording’s physically intrusive nature could amplify police departments’ arguments that recording

321. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, PUBLIC RECORDING OF POLICE ACTIVITIES: INSTRUCTOR’S
GUIDE 14 (2017), https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/pdf/PROP%20Instructor%27s%20Guide.
pdf [https://perma.cc/CMV9-AWQU] (noting that some law enforcement agencies have wrongly but
broadly interpreted what it means to materially interfere with police operations).
322. See Fields v. City of Phila., 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (“If a person’s recording interferes
with police activity, that activity might not be protected.”); Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2014) (“[A] police order that is specifically directed at the First Amendment right to film police
performing their duties in public may be constitutionally imposed only if the officer can reasonably
conclude that the filming itself is interfering, or is about to interfere, with his duties.”); State v. Russo,
407 P.3d 137, 149 (Haw. 2017) (holding that if “a reasonable officer would conclude that the
individual’s [recording] action is interfering or about to interfere with the officer’s performance of his or
her duties,” then the recording may be limited by time, place, and manner restrictions).
323. Kaminski, supra note 10, at 203.
324. Id. at 208.
325. Id. at 202.
326. Id. at 214.
327. Id. at 213.
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impermissibly interferes with their duties and therefore can be permissibly prohibited under the First Amendment.
Conversely, as explained above, emphasizing recording’s expressive costs
provides a more compelling interest justifying regulation, but with diminished
attendant risk of justifying limits on the recording of police. In fact, the
Supreme Court has struck down regulations aiming to protect police from mere
verbal interruptions as unconstitutionally overbroad.328 So, to the extent that
the recording-as-heckling framework permits regulation of recording targeted
at private citizens due to its harms to the speech of those private citizens, recording vis-à-vis the police would still be protected as a form of constitutionally protected speech.
CONCLUSION
There are both analytical and doctrinal benefits to understanding contests
between those who want to record public activity with those who want to maintain privacy as contests over expression—as battles between a heckler and
another speaker. On an analytical level, the framework helps us appreciate that
expressive values are implicated on both sides of the debate. Currently, the expressive value of privacy plays a less prominent role in the discussions, with the
expressive importance of recording taking precedent. But the heckling frame also
foregrounds that democratic governance plus liberated and vibrant public space
is contingent on a balance between the ability to maintain privacy in public and
the ability to information gather in public.
On a doctrinal level, the heckling frame makes it easier to strike that balance in
courts of law. Otherwise, if the right to record is viewed only in light of its expressive values, that right will likely continue to supersede any efforts to maintain privacy. The analogy to the heckler’s veto helps augment and enhance arguments
that recording infringes on situated and physical harms to privacy and, therefore,
that recording can be regulated pursuant to time, place, and manner restrictions,
by highlighting the expressive harms to recording. As the above discussion of
heckler’s veto law makes clear, the government has a freer hand in regulating
speech (recording) when that speech infringes on other people’s expressive
rights. Recognizing the expressive value of privacy helps justify regulation of recording and helps highlight how recording may be disruptive to other speech qua
privacy.

328. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 471–72 (1987).

